/** * \file ssl_misc.h * * \brief Internal functions shared by the SSL modules */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_MISC_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MISC_H #include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) #include "psa/crypto.h" #include "psa_util_internal.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) #include "mbedtls/md5.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) #include "mbedtls/sha1.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) #include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) #include "mbedtls/sha512.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" #endif #include "mbedtls/pk.h" #include "pk_internal.h" #include "common.h" /* Shorthand for restartable ECC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED #endif #define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */ /* Faked handshake message identity for HelloRetryRequest. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST (-MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO) /* * Internal identity of handshake extensions */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_UNRECOGNIZED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH 2 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_STATUS_REQUEST 3 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_GROUPS 4 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES 4 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG 5 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_USE_SRTP 6 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_HEARTBEAT 7 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ALPN 8 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SCT 9 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CLI_CERT_TYPE 10 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERV_CERT_TYPE 11 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PADDING 12 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PRE_SHARED_KEY 13 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EARLY_DATA 14 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS 15 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_COOKIE 16 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES 17 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CERT_AUTH 18 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_OID_FILTERS 19 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH 20 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG_CERT 21 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_KEY_SHARE 22 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_TRUNCATED_HMAC 23 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS 24 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 25 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET 26 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SESSION_TICKET 27 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT 28 /* Utility for translating IANA extension type. */ uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_id(unsigned int extension_type); uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask(unsigned int extension_type); /* Macros used to define mask constants */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(id) (1ULL << (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_##id)) /* Reset value of extension mask */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE 0 /* In messages containing extension requests, we should ignore unrecognized * extensions. In messages containing extension responses, unrecognized * extensions should result in handshake abortion. Messages containing * extension requests include ClientHello, CertificateRequest and * NewSessionTicket. Messages containing extension responses include * ServerHello, HelloRetryRequest, EncryptedExtensions and Certificate. * * RFC 8446 section 4.1.3 * * The ServerHello MUST only include extensions which are required to establish * the cryptographic context and negotiate the protocol version. * * RFC 8446 section 4.2 * * If an implementation receives an extension which it recognizes and which is * not specified for the message in which it appears, it MUST abort the handshake * with an "illegal_parameter" alert. */ /* Extensions that are not recognized by TLS 1.3 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED \ (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SESSION_TICKET) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(TRUNCATED_HMAC) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(UNRECOGNIZED)) /* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for ClientHello */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CH \ (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERVERNAME) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(USE_SRTP) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(HEARTBEAT) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ALPN) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CLI_CERT_TYPE) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERV_CERT_TYPE) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PADDING) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(COOKIE) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CERT_AUTH) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG_CERT) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED) /* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for EncryptedExtensions */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_EE \ (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERVERNAME) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(USE_SRTP) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(HEARTBEAT) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ALPN) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CLI_CERT_TYPE) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERV_CERT_TYPE) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)) /* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for CertificateRequest */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CR \ (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CERT_AUTH) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(OID_FILTERS) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG_CERT) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED) /* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for Certificate */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CT \ (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT)) /* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for ServerHello */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_SH \ (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS)) /* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for HelloRetryRequest */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_HRR \ (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(COOKIE) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS)) /* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for NewSessionTicket */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_NST \ (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED) /* * Helper macros for function call with return check. */ /* * Exit when return non-zero value */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(f) \ do { \ ret = (f); \ if (ret != 0) \ { \ goto cleanup; \ } \ } while (0) /* * Exit when return negative value */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(f) \ do { \ ret = (f); \ if (ret < 0) \ { \ goto cleanup; \ } \ } while (0) /* * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4 * * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends, * but is distinct for resends. * * Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3 /* * Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead: * counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256). */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) /* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ (defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC #endif /* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite using a * stream cipher can be used. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM #endif /* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.2 is supported. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC #endif /* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite uses Encrypt-then-MAC with CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) /* Ciphersuites using HMAC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */ #elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */ #else #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */ #endif #else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ /* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16 #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256 #else #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0 #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY #else #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0 #endif #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD (MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \ MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \ ) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN (MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN (MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)) /* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4 /* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes (the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.) */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \ (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ ? (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ : (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) \ ) /* Maximum size in bytes of list in signature algorithms ext., RFC 5246/8446 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN 65534 /* Minimum size in bytes of list in signature algorithms ext., RFC 5246/8446 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN 2 /* Maximum size in bytes of list in supported elliptic curve ext., RFC 4492 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN 65535 #define MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE 20 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) #define MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(sig, hash) ((hash << 8) | sig) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(alg) (alg & 0xFF) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_HASH_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(alg) (alg >> 8) #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ /* * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds */ #if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 #error "Bad configuration - incoming record content too large." #endif #if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 #error "Bad configuration - outgoing record content too large." #endif #if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 #error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large." #endif #if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 #error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large." #endif /* Calculate buffer sizes */ /* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the implicit sequence number. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN)) #else #define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN) \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX)) #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN)) #else #define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN) \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX)) #endif #define MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32 #define MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) /** * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for * the output buffer. For the client, this is the configured * value. For the server, it is the minimum of two - the * configured value and the negotiated one. * * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload() * * \param ssl SSL context * * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. */ size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); /** * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for * the input buffer. This is the negotiated maximum fragment * length, or, if there is none, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN. * If it is not defined either, the value is 2^14. This function * works as its predecessor, \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len(). * * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload() * * \param ssl SSL context * * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. */ size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ctx) + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX; #else return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ctx) + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; #endif } static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(ctx) + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX; #else return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(ctx) + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; #endif } #endif /* * TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content * that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because * of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required) */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0) #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1) /** * \brief This function checks if the remaining size in a buffer is * greater or equal than a needed space. * * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. * \param need Needed space in bytes. * * \return Zero if the needed space is available in the buffer, non-zero * otherwise. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr(const uint8_t *cur, const uint8_t *end, size_t need) { return (cur > end) || (need > (size_t) (end - cur)); } #else typedef struct { const uint8_t *cur; const uint8_t *end; size_t need; } mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr_args; void mbedtls_ssl_set_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args( const uint8_t *cur, const uint8_t *end, size_t need); void mbedtls_ssl_reset_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(void); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_cmp_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr_args *args); static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr(const uint8_t *cur, const uint8_t *end, size_t need) { if ((cur > end) || (need > (size_t) (end - cur))) { mbedtls_ssl_set_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(cur, end, need); return 1; } return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ /** * \brief This macro checks if the remaining size in a buffer is * greater or equal than a needed space. If it is not the case, * it returns an SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL error. * * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. * \param need Needed space in bytes. * */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(cur, end, need) \ do { \ if (mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr((cur), (end), (need)) != 0) \ { \ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; \ } \ } while (0) /** * \brief This macro checks if the remaining length in an input buffer is * greater or equal than a needed length. If it is not the case, it * returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR error and pends a * #MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR alert message. * * This is a function-like macro. It is guaranteed to evaluate each * argument exactly once. * * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. * \param need Needed length in bytes. * */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(cur, end, need) \ do { \ if (mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr((cur), (end), (need)) != 0) \ { \ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, \ ("missing input data in %s", __func__)); \ MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, \ MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); \ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; \ } \ } while (0) #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, const char *label, const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); /* cipher.h exports the maximum IV, key and block length from * all ciphers enabled in the config, regardless of whether those * ciphers are actually usable in SSL/TLS. Notably, XTS is enabled * in the default configuration and uses 64 Byte keys, but it is * not used for record protection in SSL/TLS. * * In order to prevent unnecessary inflation of key structures, * we introduce SSL-specific variants of the max-{key,block,IV} * macros here which are meant to only take those ciphers into * account which can be negotiated in SSL/TLS. * * Since the current definitions of MBEDTLS_MAX_{KEY|BLOCK|IV}_LENGTH * in cipher.h are rough overapproximations of the real maxima, here * we content ourselves with replicating those overapproximations * for the maximum block and IV length, and excluding XTS from the * computation of the maximum key length. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32 /** * \brief The data structure holding the cryptographic material (key and IV) * used for record protection in TLS 1.3. */ struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set { /*! The key for client->server records. */ unsigned char client_write_key[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; /*! The key for server->client records. */ unsigned char server_write_key[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; /*! The IV for client->server records. */ unsigned char client_write_iv[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; /*! The IV for server->client records. */ unsigned char server_write_iv[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; size_t key_len; /*!< The length of client_write_key and * server_write_key, in Bytes. */ size_t iv_len; /*!< The length of client_write_iv and * server_write_iv, in Bytes. */ }; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set mbedtls_ssl_key_set; typedef struct { unsigned char binder_key[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char client_early_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; } mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets; typedef struct { unsigned char client_handshake_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char server_handshake_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; } mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets; /* * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake. */ struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params { /* Frequently-used boolean or byte fields (placed early to take * advantage of smaller code size for indirect access on Arm Thumb) */ uint8_t resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/ uint8_t cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) uint8_t sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /* Flag indicating if a CertificateRequest message has been sent * to the client or not. */ uint8_t certificate_request_sent; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) uint8_t new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /** Minimum TLS version to be negotiated. * * It is set up in the ClientHello writing preparation stage and used * throughout the ClientHello writing. Not relevant anymore as soon as * the protocol version has been negotiated thus as soon as the * ServerHello is received. * For a fresh handshake not linked to any previous handshake, it is * equal to the configured minimum minor version to be negotiated. When * renegotiating or resuming a session, it is equal to the previously * negotiated minor version. * * There is no maximum TLS version field in this handshake context. * From the start of the handshake, we need to define a current protocol * version for the record layer which we define as the maximum TLS * version to be negotiated. The `tls_version` field of the SSL context is * used to store this maximum value until it contains the actual * negotiated value. */ mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version min_tls_version; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) uint8_t extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) uint8_t async_in_progress; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) unsigned char group_list_heap_allocated; unsigned char sig_algs_heap_allocated; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) uint8_t ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */ enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */ ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */ ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */ ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */ ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */ ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */ } ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */ mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */ size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */ #endif mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf; /* * Handshake specific crypto variables */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) uint8_t key_exchange_mode; /*!< Selected key exchange mode */ /** Number of HelloRetryRequest messages received/sent from/to the server. */ int hello_retry_request_count; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** selected_group of key_share extension in HelloRetryRequest message. */ uint16_t hrr_selected_group; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) uint8_t tls13_kex_modes; /*!< Key exchange modes supported by the client */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) uint16_t new_session_tickets_count; /*!< number of session tickets */ #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) uint16_t received_sig_algs[MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE]; #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) const uint16_t *group_list; const uint16_t *sig_algs; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) mbedtls_dhm_context dhm_ctx; /*!< DHM key exchange */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_ctx; /*!< ECDH key exchange */ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED) psa_key_type_t xxdh_psa_type; size_t xxdh_psa_bits; mbedtls_svc_key_id_t xxdh_psa_privkey; uint8_t xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external; unsigned char xxdh_psa_peerkey[PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE]; size_t xxdh_psa_peerkey_len; #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_pake_password; uint8_t psa_pake_ctx_is_ok; #else mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */ size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */ #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) uint16_t *curves_tls_id; /*!< List of TLS IDs of supported elliptic curves */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */ uint8_t psk_opaque_is_internal; #else unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */ size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ uint16_t selected_identity; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */ mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */ mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ struct { size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated * buffers used for message buffering. */ uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has * been seen in the current flight. */ struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer { unsigned is_valid : 1; unsigned is_fragmented : 1; unsigned is_complete : 1; unsigned char *data; size_t data_len; } hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS]; struct { unsigned char *data; size_t len; unsigned epoch; } future_record; } buffering; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)) unsigned char *cookie; /*!< HelloVerifyRequest cookie for DTLS * HelloRetryRequest cookie for TLS 1.3 */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) /* RFC 6347 page 15 ... opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; ... */ uint8_t cookie_len; #else /* RFC 8446 page 39 ... opaque cookie<0..2^16-1>; ... If TLS1_3 is enabled, the max length is 2^16 - 1 */ uint16_t cookie_len; /*!< DTLS: HelloVerifyRequest cookie length * TLS1_3: HelloRetryRequest cookie length */ #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 ) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) unsigned char cookie_verify_result; /*!< Srv: flag for sending a cookie */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */ unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */ uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */ mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */ mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */ unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */ unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the flight being received */ mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for resending messages */ unsigned char alt_out_ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter for resending messages */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) /* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */ uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension * has been negotiated. Possible values are * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ unsigned char peer_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; /*! The peer's CID */ uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of * \c peer_cid. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ /* * Checksum contexts */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa; #else mbedtls_md_context_t fin_sha256; #endif #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa; #else mbedtls_md_context_t fin_sha384; #endif #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) uint16_t offered_group_id; /* The NamedGroup value for the group * that is being used for ephemeral * key exchange. * * On the client: Defaults to the first * entry in the client's group list, * but can be overwritten by the HRR. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) uint8_t client_auth; /*!< used to check if CertificateRequest has been received from server side. If CertificateRequest has been received, Certificate and CertificateVerify should be sent to server */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ /* * State-local variables used during the processing * of a specific handshake state. */ union { /* Outgoing Finished message */ struct { uint8_t preparation_done; /* Buffer holding digest of the handshake up to * but excluding the outgoing finished message. */ unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; size_t digest_len; } finished_out; /* Incoming Finished message */ struct { uint8_t preparation_done; /* Buffer holding digest of the handshake up to but * excluding the peer's incoming finished message. */ unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; size_t digest_len; } finished_in; } state_local; /* End of state-local variables. */ unsigned char randbytes[MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; /*!< random bytes */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE]; /*!< premaster secret */ size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) uint32_t sent_extensions; /*!< extensions sent by endpoint */ uint32_t received_extensions; /*!< extensions received by endpoint */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) unsigned char certificate_request_context_len; unsigned char *certificate_request_context; #endif /** TLS 1.3 transform for encrypted handshake messages. */ mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_handshake; union { unsigned char early[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char handshake[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char app[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; } tls13_master_secrets; mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets tls13_hs_secrets; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) /** TLS 1.3 transform for early data and handshake messages. */ mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_earlydata; #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) /** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the * asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start, * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_decrypt_start, * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel). * The library does not use it internally. */ void *user_async_ctx; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) const unsigned char *sni_name; /*!< raw SNI */ size_t sni_name_len; /*!< raw SNI len */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) const mbedtls_x509_crt *dn_hints; /*!< acceptable client cert issuers */ #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ }; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer; /* * Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records * * There are the following general types of record transformations: * - Stream transformations (TLS versions == 1.2 only) * Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher * to the authenticated message. * - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only) * For TLS 1.2, no IV is generated at key extraction time, but every * encrypted record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was * encrypted. * - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only) * These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one * used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second * one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3. * In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained * as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte * record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number * to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation * the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction * time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the * latter to the encrypted record. * * Additionally, DTLS 1.2 + CID as well as TLS 1.3 use an inner plaintext * which allows to add flexible length padding and to hide a record's true * content type. * * In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant: * - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used. * - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher. * - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used. * - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest. * - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit, * random initialization vector placed in encrypted records. * - For some transformations (currently AEAD) an implicit IV. It is static * and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation- * -dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3). * - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC. * - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version. * - The length of the authentication tag. * * The struct below refines this abstract view as follows: * - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in * cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the * same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines * the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if * the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM * then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD. * - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but * are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}. * - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts * used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts * are unused for AEAD transformations. * - For stream/CBC transformations, the MAC keys are not stored explicitly * but maintained within md_ctx_{enc/dec}. * - The mac_enc and mac_dec fields are unused for EAD transformations. * - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within * the transformation context, its contents are stored within * iv_{enc/dec}. * - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV. * This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations * which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the * IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be * different from the underlying cipher's block length * in this case. * - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only * and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is * constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in * the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays. * - tls_version denotes the 2-byte TLS version * - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the * authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0. * - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the * authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0. * - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the * order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused * in other transformations. * */ struct mbedtls_ssl_transform { /* * Session specific crypto layer */ size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */ size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */ size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */ size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */ size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */ unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */ unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_mac_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_mac_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */ psa_algorithm_t psa_mac_alg; /*!< psa MAC algorithm */ #else mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */ mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version; #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_enc; /*!< psa encryption key */ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_dec; /*!< psa decryption key */ psa_algorithm_t psa_alg; /*!< psa algorithm */ #else mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_enc; /*!< encryption context */ mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_dec; /*!< decryption context */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) uint8_t in_cid_len; uint8_t out_cid_len; unsigned char in_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; unsigned char out_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) /* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the * Master Secret and other session info, * see ssl_tls12_populate_transform() */ unsigned char randbytes[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ }; /* * Return 1 if the transform uses an AEAD cipher, 0 otherwise. * Equivalently, return 0 if a separate MAC is used, 1 otherwise. */ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead( const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) return transform->maclen == 0 && transform->taglen != 0; #else (void) transform; return 1; #endif } /* * Internal representation of record frames * * Instances come in two flavors: * (1) Encrypted * These always have data_offset = 0 * (2) Unencrypted * These have data_offset set to the amount of * pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely, * this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV * used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used * (e.g. for stream ciphers). * * The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case * is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to * an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the * encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to * make space for the fixed IV. * */ #if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX #else #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX #endif typedef struct { uint8_t ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number. * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by * the 6-byte sequence number. * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of * MAC computations. */ uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */ uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire. * Convert to internal presentation of versions * using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and * mbedtls_ssl_write_version(). * Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */ unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */ size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */ size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */ size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */ unsigned char cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX]; /* The CID */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ } mbedtls_record; #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /* * List of certificate + private key pairs */ struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert { mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */ mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */ mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */ }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) /* * List of handshake messages kept around for resending */ struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item { unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */ size_t len; /*!< length of p */ unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */ mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */ }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) /** * \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS * 1.2 specific extensions of the ClientHello message. * * \param[in] ssl SSL context * \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the extensions * \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the extensions * \param uses_ec Whether one proposed ciphersuite uses an elliptic curve * (<> 0) or not ( 0 ). * \param[out] out_len Length of the data written into the buffer \p buf */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end, int uses_ec, size_t *out_len); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /** * \brief Find the preferred hash for a given signature algorithm. * * \param[in] ssl SSL context * \param[in] sig_alg A signature algorithm identifier as defined in the * TLS 1.2 SignatureAlgorithm enumeration. * * \return The preferred hash algorithm for \p sig_alg. It is a hash algorithm * identifier as defined in the TLS 1.2 HashAlgorithm enumeration. */ unsigned int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned int sig_alg); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ /** * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear * memory * * \param transform SSL transform context */ void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); /** * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL handshake context and clear * memory * * \param ssl SSL context */ void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); /* set inbound transform of ssl context */ void mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); /* set outbound transform of ssl context */ void mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); static inline void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_states state) { ssl->state = (int) state; } MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); /** * \brief Update record layer * * This function roughly separates the implementation * of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation * of the secure transport. * * \param ssl The SSL context to use. * \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest * should be automatically updated in case * a handshake message is found. * * \return 0 or non-zero error code. * * \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here * is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible: * * The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying * transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into * a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which * conceptually provides the following: * * (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports * for handshake, alert and CCS messages. * (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport * for application data. * (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform * securing the contents. * * The interface to this functionality is given as follows: * * a Updating * [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record] * * Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending: * Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application * data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers * provide access to the data for the user to process it. * Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically * on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers * for previous datagrams, while consumption of application * data (2) is user-controlled. * * b Reading of application data * [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer] * * As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data * is different from the automatic consumption of control * datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream. * * c Tracking availability of application data * [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen] * * For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for * application data in case of DTLS, the record layer * provides functionality for checking how much application * data is still available in the internal buffer. * * d Changing the transformation securing the communication. * * Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the * above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic * of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything * about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g. * in all the handshake handling functions, and in the * application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read. * * \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the * record layer, but the current implementation deviates * from it in some places. For example, our implementation of * the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record * discards datagrams depending on the current state, which * wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility * following the above definition. * */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_read_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned update_hs_digest); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want); /* * Write handshake message header */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned hs_type, unsigned char **buf, size_t *buf_len); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int update_checksum, int force_flush); static inline int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { return mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext(ssl, 1 /* update checksum */, 1 /* force flush */); } /* * Write handshake message tail */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t buf_len, size_t msg_len); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_write_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int force_flush); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info); /* * Update checksum of handshake messages. */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned hs_type, unsigned char const *msg, size_t msg_len); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned hs_type, size_t total_hs_len); #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex); #endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /** * Get the first defined opaque PSK by order of precedence: * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in the PSK * callback * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() * Return an opaque PSK */ static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { return ssl->handshake->psk_opaque; } if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->conf->psk_opaque)) { return ssl->conf->psk_opaque; } return MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; } #else /** * Get the first defined PSK by order of precedence: * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() * Return a code and update the pair (PSK, PSK length) passed to this function */ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_psk(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char **psk, size_t *psk_len) { if (ssl->handshake->psk != NULL && ssl->handshake->psk_len > 0) { *psk = ssl->handshake->psk; *psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len; } else if (ssl->conf->psk != NULL && ssl->conf->psk_len > 0) { *psk = ssl->conf->psk; *psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len; } else { *psk = NULL; *psk_len = 0; return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; } return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_pk_context *pk); unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(mbedtls_pk_type_t type); mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(unsigned char sig); #endif mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(unsigned char hash); unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(int md); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md); #endif MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t tls_id); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ /** * \brief Return PSA EC info for the specified TLS ID. * * \param tls_id The TLS ID to look for * \param type If the TLD ID is supported, then proper \c psa_key_type_t * value is returned here. Can be NULL. * \param bits If the TLD ID is supported, then proper bit size is returned * here. Can be NULL. * \return PSA_SUCCESS if the TLS ID is supported, * PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED otherwise * * \note If either \c family or \c bits parameters are NULL, then * the corresponding value is not returned. * The function can be called with both parameters as NULL * simply to check if a specific TLS ID is supported. */ int mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id, psa_key_type_t *type, size_t *bits); /** * \brief Return \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id for the specified TLS ID. * * \param tls_id The TLS ID to look for * \return Proper \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id if the TLS ID is supported, * or MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE otherwise */ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id); /** * \brief Return TLS ID for the specified \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id. * * \param grp_id The \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id ID to look for * \return Proper TLS ID if the \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id is supported, * or 0 otherwise */ uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id); #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) /** * \brief Return EC's name for the specified TLS ID. * * \param tls_id The TLS ID to look for * \return A pointer to a const string with the proper name. If TLS * ID is not supported, a NULL pointer is returned instead. */ const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) static inline mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value (const uint16_t srtp_profile_value) { switch (srtp_profile_value) { case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80: case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32: case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80: case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32: return srtp_profile_value; default: break; } return MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; } #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) static inline mbedtls_pk_context *mbedtls_ssl_own_key(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; if (ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL) { key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; } else { key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; } return key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->key; } static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; if (ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL) { key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; } else { key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; } return key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->cert; } /* * Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions: * keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later). * * Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we * check a cert we received from them)! * * Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not. */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, int cert_endpoint, uint32_t *flags); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ void mbedtls_ssl_write_version(unsigned char version[2], int transport, mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version); uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_read_version(const unsigned char version[2], int transport); static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ((void) ssl); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { return 13; } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ { return 5; } } static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { return (size_t) (ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_hdr); } static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { return 12; } #else ((void) ssl); #endif return 4; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_resend(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #endif /* Visible for testing purposes only */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl); void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #endif MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, const mbedtls_ssl_session *src); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) /* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, mbedtls_record *rec, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, mbedtls_record *rec); /* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */ static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { return 2; } #else ((void) ssl); #endif return 0; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial); void mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial); /* * Send pending alert */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); /* * Set pending fatal alert flag. */ void mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char alert_type, int alert_reason); /* Alias of mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(type, user_return_value) \ mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert(ssl, type, user_return_value) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #endif void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free(mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ /** * ssl utils functions for checking configuration. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_only(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) { return conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) { return conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 && conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_enabled(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) return conf->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && conf->max_tls_version >= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; #else ((void) conf); return 0; #endif } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_enabled(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) return conf->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 && conf->max_tls_version >= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; #else ((void) conf); return 0; #endif } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_hybrid_tls12_tls13(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) { return conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 && conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) extern const uint8_t mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic[ MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); /** * \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS * 1.3 specific extensions of the ClientHello message. * * \param[in] ssl SSL context * \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the extensions * \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the extensions * \param[out] out_len Length of the data written into the buffer \p buf */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len); /** * \brief TLS 1.3 client side state machine entry * * \param ssl SSL context */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); /** * \brief TLS 1.3 server side state machine entry * * \param ssl SSL context */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); /* * Helper functions around key exchange modes. */ static inline unsigned mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int kex_mode_mask) { return (ssl->conf->tls13_kex_modes & kex_mode_mask) != 0; } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_psk_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK); } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_psk_ephemeral_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL); } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_ephemeral_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL); } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL); } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_psk_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) /** * Given a list of key exchange modes, check if at least one of them is * supported. * * \param[in] ssl SSL context * \param kex_modes_mask Mask of the key exchange modes to check * * \return 0 if at least one of the key exchange modes is supported, * !=0 otherwise. */ static inline unsigned mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_kex_modes(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int kex_modes_mask) { return (ssl->handshake->tls13_kex_modes & kex_modes_mask) == 0; } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_psk_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { return !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_kex_modes(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK); } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_psk_ephemeral_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { return !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_kex_modes(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL); } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_ephemeral_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { return !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_kex_modes(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL); } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { return !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_kex_modes(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL); } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_some_psk_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { return !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_kex_modes(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ /* * Helper functions for extensions checking. */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int hs_msg_type, unsigned int received_extension_type, uint32_t hs_msg_allowed_extensions_mask); static inline void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned int extension_type) { ssl->handshake->sent_extensions |= mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask(extension_type); } /* * Helper functions to check the selected key exchange mode. */ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_check( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int kex_mask) { return (ssl->handshake->key_exchange_mode & kex_mask) != 0; } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_check(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL); } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_ephemeral( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_check(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL); } /* * Fetch TLS 1.3 handshake message header */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned hs_type, unsigned char **buf, size_t *buf_len); /** * \brief Detect if a list of extensions contains a supported_versions * extension or not. * * \param[in] ssl SSL context * \param[in] buf Address of the first byte of the extensions vector. * \param[in] end End of the buffer containing the list of extensions. * \param[out] supported_versions_data If the extension is present, address of * its first byte of data, NULL otherwise. * \param[out] supported_versions_data_end If the extension is present, address * of the first byte immediately * following the extension data, NULL * otherwise. * \return 0 if the list of extensions does not contain a supported_versions * extension. * \return 1 if the list of extensions contains a supported_versions * extension. * \return A negative value if an error occurred while parsing the * extensions. */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end, const unsigned char **supported_versions_data, const unsigned char **supported_versions_data_end); /* * Handler of TLS 1.3 server certificate message */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) /* * Handler of TLS 1.3 write Certificate message */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); /* * Handler of TLS 1.3 write Certificate Verify message */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ /* * Generic handler of Certificate Verify */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); /* * Write of dummy-CCS's for middlebox compatibility */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_xxdh_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t named_group, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len); #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /* * Write Signature Algorithm extension */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_write_sig_alg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len); /* * Parse TLS Signature Algorithm extension */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ /* Get handshake transcript */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_md_type_t md, unsigned char *dst, size_t dst_len, size_t *olen); /* * Return supported groups. * * In future, invocations can be changed to ssl->conf->group_list * when mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() is deleted. * * ssl->handshake->group_list is either a translation of curve_list to IANA TLS group * identifiers when mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() has been used, or a pointer to * ssl->conf->group_list when mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups() has been more recently invoked. * */ static inline const void *mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) return ssl->conf->group_list; #else if ((ssl->handshake != NULL) && (ssl->handshake->group_list != NULL)) { return ssl->handshake->group_list; } else { return ssl->conf->group_list; } #endif } /* * Helper functions for NamedGroup. */ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_named_group_is_ecdhe(uint16_t named_group) { /* * RFC 8422 section 5.1.1 */ return named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519 || named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1 || named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1 || named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1 || named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448 || /* Below deprecated curves should be removed with notice to users */ named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1 || named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1 || named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1 || named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1 || named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1 || named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 || named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1 || named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1; } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(uint16_t named_group) { return named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519 || named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 || named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1 || named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1 || named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448; } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(uint16_t named_group) { return named_group >= MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048 && named_group <= MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192; } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_offered( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t named_group) { const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); if (group_list == NULL) { return 0; } for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { if (*group_list == named_group) { return 1; } } return 0; } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_supported(uint16_t named_group) { #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(named_group)) { if (mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(named_group) != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { return 1; } } #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(named_group)) { return 1; } #endif #if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) (void) named_group; #endif return 0; } /* * Return supported signature algorithms. * * In future, invocations can be changed to ssl->conf->sig_algs when * mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes() is deleted. * * ssl->handshake->sig_algs is either a translation of sig_hashes to IANA TLS * signature algorithm identifiers when mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes() has been * used, or a pointer to ssl->conf->sig_algs when mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs() has * been more recently invoked. * */ static inline const void *mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->sig_algs_heap_allocated == 1 && ssl->handshake->sig_algs != NULL) { return ssl->handshake->sig_algs; } #endif return ssl->conf->sig_algs; #else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ ((void) ssl); return NULL; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t own_sig_alg) { const uint16_t *sig_alg = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs; if (sig_alg == NULL) { return 0; } for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { if (*sig_alg == own_sig_alg) { return 1; } } return 0; } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported( const uint16_t sig_alg) { switch (sig_alg) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) && defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256: break; #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) && defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384: break; #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) && defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512: break; #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256: break; #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384: break; #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512: break; #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ default: return 0; } return 1; } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_supported( const uint16_t sig_alg) { switch (sig_alg) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256: break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384: break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512: break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ default: return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported( sig_alg); } return 1; } MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match(uint16_t sig_alg, mbedtls_pk_context *key); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t proposed_sig_alg) { const uint16_t *sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs(ssl); if (sig_alg == NULL) { return 0; } for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { if (*sig_alg == proposed_sig_alg) { return 1; } } return 0; } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg( uint16_t sig_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_type, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg) { *pk_type = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(sig_alg & 0xff); *md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash((sig_alg >> 8) & 0xff); if (*pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE && *md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { return 0; } switch (sig_alg) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256: *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384: *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512: *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512; *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } return 0; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_sig_alg_is_supported( const uint16_t sig_alg) { /* High byte is hash */ unsigned char hash = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(sig_alg); unsigned char sig = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(sig_alg); switch (hash) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5: break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1: break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224: break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512: break; #endif default: return 0; } switch (sig) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA: break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA: break; #endif default: return 0; } return 1; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const uint16_t sig_alg) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { return mbedtls_ssl_tls12_sig_alg_is_supported(sig_alg); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_supported(sig_alg); } #endif ((void) ssl); ((void) sig_alg); return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) /* Corresponding PSA algorithm for MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL. * Same value is used for PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER, hence it is * guaranteed to not be a valid PSA algorithm identifier. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER 0x04000000 /** * \brief Translate mbedtls cipher type/taglen pair to psa: * algorithm, key type and key size. * * \param mbedtls_cipher_type [in] given mbedtls cipher type * \param taglen [in] given tag length * 0 - default tag length * \param alg [out] corresponding PSA alg * There is no corresponding PSA * alg for MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, so * in this case MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER * is returned via this parameter * \param key_type [out] corresponding PSA key type * \param key_size [out] corresponding PSA key size * * \return PSA_SUCCESS on success or PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED if * conversion is not supported. */ psa_status_t mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_type, size_t taglen, psa_algorithm_t *alg, psa_key_type_t *key_type, size_t *key_size); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief Convert given PSA status to mbedtls error code. * * \param status [in] given PSA status * * \return corresponding mbedtls error code */ static inline MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status) { switch (status) { case PSA_SUCCESS: return 0; case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE: return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) typedef enum { MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE, MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO } mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t; /** * \brief Parse the provided input buffer for getting the first round * of key exchange. This code is common between server and client * * \param pake_ctx [in] the PAKE's operation/context structure * \param buf [in] input buffer to parse * \param len [in] length of the input buffer * \param round [in] either MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE or * MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO * * \return 0 on success or a negative error code in case of failure */ int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round); /** * \brief Write the first round of key exchange into the provided output * buffer. This code is common between server and client * * \param pake_ctx [in] the PAKE's operation/context structure * \param buf [out] the output buffer in which data will be written to * \param len [in] length of the output buffer * \param olen [out] the length of the data really written on the buffer * \param round [in] either MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE or * MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO * * \return 0 on success or a negative error code in case of failure */ int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round( psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round); #endif //MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO /** * \brief TLS record protection modes */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM = 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC, MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM, MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD } mbedtls_ssl_mode_t; mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_transform( const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( int encrypt_then_mac, const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite); #else mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_read_public_xxdhe_share(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len); #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int cipher_suite) { const int *ciphersuite_list = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list; /* Check whether we have offered this ciphersuite */ for (size_t i = 0; ciphersuite_list[i] != 0; i++) { if (ciphersuite_list[i] == cipher_suite) { return 1; } } return 0; } /** * \brief Validate cipher suite against config in SSL context. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param suite_info Cipher suite to validate * \param min_tls_version Minimal TLS version to accept a cipher suite * \param max_tls_version Maximal TLS version to accept a cipher suite * * \return 0 if valid, negative value otherwise. */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info, mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version min_tls_version, mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version max_tls_version); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_EXTENSION_DATA_LENGTH (2) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN (64) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end); MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) /** * \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS * 1.3 specific Pre-Shared key extension. * * \param[in] ssl SSL context * \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the extension * \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the extension * \param[out] out_len Length in bytes of the Pre-Shared key extension: data * written into the buffer \p buf by this function plus * the length of the binders to be written. * \param[out] binders_len Length of the binders to be written at the end of * the extension. */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_identities_of_pre_shared_key_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len, size_t *binders_len); /** * \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS * 1.3 specific Pre-Shared key extension binders at the end of the * ClientHello. * * \param[in] ssl SSL context * \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the binders * \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the binders */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_binders_of_pre_shared_key_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_session_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, const char *hostname); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) static inline unsigned int mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ticket_flags( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags) { return session->ticket_flags & (flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK); } static inline void mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_flags( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags) { session->ticket_flags |= (flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK); } static inline void mbedtls_ssl_session_clear_ticket_flags( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags) { session->ticket_flags &= ~(flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) /** Compute the HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow. * * This function computes the HMAC of the concatenation of \p add_data and \p * data, and does with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not * depend on \p data_len_secret, but only on \p min_data_len and \p * max_data_len. In particular, this function always reads exactly \p * max_data_len bytes from \p data. * * \param ctx The HMAC context. It must have keys configured * with mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and use one of the * following hashes: SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1 or MD-5. * It is reset using mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() after * the computation is complete to prepare for the * next computation. * \param add_data The first part of the message whose HMAC is being * calculated. This must point to a readable buffer * of \p add_data_len bytes. * \param add_data_len The length of \p add_data in bytes. * \param data The buffer containing the second part of the * message. This must point to a readable buffer * of \p max_data_len bytes. * \param data_len_secret The length of the data to process in \p data. * This must be no less than \p min_data_len and no * greater than \p max_data_len. * \param min_data_len The minimal length of the second part of the * message, read from \p data. * \param max_data_len The maximal length of the second part of the * message, read from \p data. * \param output The HMAC will be written here. This must point to * a writable buffer of sufficient size to hold the * HMAC value. * * \retval 0 on success. * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED * The hardware accelerator failed. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t mac_alg, const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret, size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len, unsigned char *output); #else int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret, size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len, unsigned char *output); #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) */ #endif /* ssl_misc.h */