/** * \file psa/crypto_values.h * * \brief PSA cryptography module: macros to build and analyze integer values. * * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must * include psa/crypto.h. Drivers must include the appropriate driver * header file. * * This file contains portable definitions of macros to build and analyze * values of integral types that encode properties of cryptographic keys, * designations of cryptographic algorithms, and error codes returned by * the library. * * Note that many of the constants defined in this file are embedded in * the persistent key store, as part of key metadata (including usage * policies). As a consequence, they must not be changed (unless the storage * format version changes). * * This header file only defines preprocessor macros. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H #include "mbedtls/private_access.h" /** \defgroup error Error codes * @{ */ /* PSA error codes */ /* Error codes are standardized across PSA domains (framework, crypto, storage, * etc.). Do not change the values in this section or even the expansions * of each macro: it must be possible to `#include` both this header * and some other PSA component's headers in the same C source, * which will lead to duplicate definitions of the `PSA_SUCCESS` and * `PSA_ERROR_xxx` macros, which is ok if and only if the macros expand * to the same sequence of tokens. * * If you must add a new * value, check with the Arm PSA framework group to pick one that other * domains aren't already using. */ /* Tell uncrustify not to touch the constant definitions, otherwise * it might change the spacing to something that is not PSA-compliant * (e.g. adding a space after casts). * * *INDENT-OFF* */ /** The action was completed successfully. */ #define PSA_SUCCESS ((psa_status_t)0) /** An error occurred that does not correspond to any defined * failure cause. * * Implementations may use this error code if none of the other standard * error codes are applicable. */ #define PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ((psa_status_t)-132) /** The requested operation or a parameter is not supported * by this implementation. * * Implementations should return this error code when an enumeration * parameter such as a key type, algorithm, etc. is not recognized. * If a combination of parameters is recognized and identified as * not valid, return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT instead. */ #define PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ((psa_status_t)-134) /** The requested action is denied by a policy. * * Implementations should return this error code when the parameters * are recognized as valid and supported, and a policy explicitly * denies the requested operation. * * If a subset of the parameters of a function call identify a * forbidden operation, and another subset of the parameters are * not valid or not supported, it is unspecified whether the function * returns #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED or * #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. */ #define PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ((psa_status_t)-133) /** An output buffer is too small. * * Applications can call the \c PSA_xxx_SIZE macro listed in the function * description to determine a sufficient buffer size. * * Implementations should preferably return this error code only * in cases when performing the operation with a larger output * buffer would succeed. However implementations may return this * error if a function has invalid or unsupported parameters in addition * to the parameters that determine the necessary output buffer size. */ #define PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ((psa_status_t)-138) /** Asking for an item that already exists * * Implementations should return this error, when attempting * to write an item (like a key) that already exists. */ #define PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ((psa_status_t)-139) /** Asking for an item that doesn't exist * * Implementations should return this error, if a requested item (like * a key) does not exist. */ #define PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ((psa_status_t)-140) /** The requested action cannot be performed in the current state. * * Multipart operations return this error when one of the * functions is called out of sequence. Refer to the function * descriptions for permitted sequencing of functions. * * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate * that a key either exists or not, * but shall instead return #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS or #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST * as applicable. * * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a * key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * instead. */ #define PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ((psa_status_t)-137) /** The parameters passed to the function are invalid. * * Implementations may return this error any time a parameter or * combination of parameters are recognized as invalid. * * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a * key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * instead. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ((psa_status_t)-135) /** There is not enough runtime memory. * * If the action is carried out across multiple security realms, this * error can refer to available memory in any of the security realms. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ((psa_status_t)-141) /** There is not enough persistent storage. * * Functions that modify the key storage return this error code if * there is insufficient storage space on the host media. In addition, * many functions that do not otherwise access storage may return this * error code if the implementation requires a mandatory log entry for * the requested action and the log storage space is full. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE ((psa_status_t)-142) /** There was a communication failure inside the implementation. * * This can indicate a communication failure between the application * and an external cryptoprocessor or between the cryptoprocessor and * an external volatile or persistent memory. A communication failure * may be transient or permanent depending on the cause. * * \warning If a function returns this error, it is undetermined * whether the requested action has completed or not. Implementations * should return #PSA_SUCCESS on successful completion whenever * possible, however functions may return #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * if the requested action was completed successfully in an external * cryptoprocessor but there was a breakdown of communication before * the cryptoprocessor could report the status to the application. */ #define PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-145) /** There was a storage failure that may have led to data loss. * * This error indicates that some persistent storage is corrupted. * It should not be used for a corruption of volatile memory * (use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED), for a communication error * between the cryptoprocessor and its external storage (use * #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE), or when the storage is * in a valid state but is full (use #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE). * * Note that a storage failure does not indicate that any data that was * previously read is invalid. However this previously read data may no * longer be readable from storage. * * When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure * the global integrity of the keystore. Depending on the global * integrity guarantees offered by the implementation, access to other * data may or may not fail even if the data is still readable but * its integrity cannot be guaranteed. * * Implementations should only use this error code to report a * permanent storage corruption. However application writers should * keep in mind that transient errors while reading the storage may be * reported using this error code. */ #define PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-146) /** A hardware failure was detected. * * A hardware failure may be transient or permanent depending on the * cause. */ #define PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-147) /** A tampering attempt was detected. * * If an application receives this error code, there is no guarantee * that previously accessed or computed data was correct and remains * confidential. Applications should not perform any security function * and should enter a safe failure state. * * Implementations may return this error code if they detect an invalid * state that cannot happen during normal operation and that indicates * that the implementation's security guarantees no longer hold. Depending * on the implementation architecture and on its security and safety goals, * the implementation may forcibly terminate the application. * * This error code is intended as a last resort when a security breach * is detected and it is unsure whether the keystore data is still * protected. Implementations shall only return this error code * to report an alarm from a tampering detector, to indicate that * the confidentiality of stored data can no longer be guaranteed, * or to indicate that the integrity of previously returned data is now * considered compromised. Implementations shall not use this error code * to indicate a hardware failure that merely makes it impossible to * perform the requested operation (use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE, * #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE, #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE, * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY or other applicable error code * instead). * * This error indicates an attack against the application. Implementations * shall not return this error code as a consequence of the behavior of * the application itself. */ #define PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ((psa_status_t)-151) /** There is not enough entropy to generate random data needed * for the requested action. * * This error indicates a failure of a hardware random generator. * Application writers should note that this error can be returned not * only by functions whose purpose is to generate random data, such * as key, IV or nonce generation, but also by functions that execute * an algorithm with a randomized result, as well as functions that * use randomization of intermediate computations as a countermeasure * to certain attacks. * * Implementations should avoid returning this error after psa_crypto_init() * has succeeded. Implementations should generate sufficient * entropy during initialization and subsequently use a cryptographically * secure pseudorandom generator (PRNG). However implementations may return * this error at any time if a policy requires the PRNG to be reseeded * during normal operation. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ((psa_status_t)-148) /** The signature, MAC or hash is incorrect. * * Verification functions return this error if the verification * calculations completed successfully, and the value to be verified * was determined to be incorrect. * * If the value to verify has an invalid size, implementations may return * either #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ((psa_status_t)-149) /** The decrypted padding is incorrect. * * \warning In some protocols, when decrypting data, it is essential that * the behavior of the application does not depend on whether the padding * is correct, down to precise timing. Applications should prefer * protocols that use authenticated encryption rather than plain * encryption. If the application must perform a decryption of * unauthenticated data, the application writer should take care not * to reveal whether the padding is invalid. * * Implementations should strive to make valid and invalid padding * as close as possible to indistinguishable to an external observer. * In particular, the timing of a decryption operation should not * depend on the validity of the padding. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ((psa_status_t)-150) /** Return this error when there's insufficient data when attempting * to read from a resource. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ((psa_status_t)-143) /** The key identifier is not valid. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ((psa_status_t)-136) /** Stored data has been corrupted. * * This error indicates that some persistent storage has suffered corruption. * It does not indicate the following situations, which have specific error * codes: * * - A corruption of volatile memory - use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED. * - A communication error between the cryptoprocessor and its external * storage - use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE. * - When the storage is in a valid state but is full - use * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE. * - When the storage fails for other reasons - use * #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE. * - When the stored data is not valid - use #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID. * * \note A storage corruption does not indicate that any data that was * previously read is invalid. However this previously read data might no * longer be readable from storage. * * When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure the * global integrity of the keystore. */ #define PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT ((psa_status_t)-152) /** Data read from storage is not valid for the implementation. * * This error indicates that some data read from storage does not have a valid * format. It does not indicate the following situations, which have specific * error codes: * * - When the storage or stored data is corrupted - use #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT * - When the storage fails for other reasons - use #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * - An invalid argument to the API - use #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * * This error is typically a result of either storage corruption on a * cleartext storage backend, or an attempt to read data that was * written by an incompatible version of the library. */ #define PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ((psa_status_t)-153) /** The function that returns this status is defined as interruptible and * still has work to do, thus the user should call the function again with the * same operation context until it either returns #PSA_SUCCESS or any other * error. This is not an error per se, more a notification of status. */ #define PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE ((psa_status_t)-248) /* *INDENT-ON* */ /**@}*/ /** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types * @{ */ /* Note that key type values, including ECC family and DH group values, are * embedded in the persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a * consequence, they must not be changed (unless the storage format version * changes). */ /** An invalid key type value. * * Zero is not the encoding of any key type. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x0000) /** Vendor-defined key type flag. * * Key types defined by this standard will never have the * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set. Vendors who define additional key types * must use an encoding with the #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should * respect the bitwise structure used by standard encodings whenever practical. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_key_type_t) 0x8000) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7000) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1000) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2000) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4000) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7000) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t) 0x3000) /** Whether a key type is vendor-defined. * * See also #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(type) \ (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0) /** Whether a key type is an unstructured array of bytes. * * This encompasses both symmetric keys and non-key data. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(type) \ (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW || \ ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC) /** Whether a key type is asymmetric: either a key pair or a public key. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(type) \ (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK \ & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) == \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY) /** Whether a key type is the public part of a key pair. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY) /** Whether a key type is a key pair containing a private part and a public * part. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type) \ (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR) /** The key pair type corresponding to a public key type. * * You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged. * * \param type A public key type or key pair type. * * \return The corresponding key pair type. * If \p type is not a public key or a key pair, * the return value is undefined. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ ((type) | PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) /** The public key type corresponding to a key pair type. * * You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged. * * \param type A public key type or key pair type. * * \return The corresponding public key type. * If \p type is not a public key or a key pair, * the return value is undefined. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) \ ((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) /** Raw data. * * A "key" of this type cannot be used for any cryptographic operation. * Applications may use this type to store arbitrary data in the keystore. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1001) /** HMAC key. * * The key policy determines which underlying hash algorithm the key can be * used for. * * HMAC keys should generally have the same size as the underlying hash. * This size can be calculated with #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where * \c alg is the HMAC algorithm or the underlying hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1100) /** A secret for key derivation. * * This key type is for high-entropy secrets only. For low-entropy secrets, * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD should be used instead. * * These keys can be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input of key derivation algorithms. * * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key * can be used for. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1200) /** A low-entropy secret for password hashing or key derivation. * * This key type is suitable for passwords and passphrases which are typically * intended to be memorizable by humans, and have a low entropy relative to * their size. It can be used for randomly generated or derived keys with * maximum or near-maximum entropy, but #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE is more suitable * for such keys. It is not suitable for passwords with extremely low entropy, * such as numerical PINs. * * These keys can be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input of * key derivation algorithms. Algorithms that accept such an input were * designed to accept low-entropy secret and are known as password hashing or * key stretching algorithms. * * These keys cannot be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET input of * key derivation algorithms, as the algorithms that take such an input expect * it to be high-entropy. * * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key can be * used for, among the permissible subset defined above. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1203) /** A secret value that can be used to verify a password hash. * * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key * can be used for, among the same permissible subset as for * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1205) /** A secret value that can be used in when computing a password hash. * * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key * can be used for, among the subset of algorithms that can use pepper. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1206) /** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the AES block cipher. * * The size of the key can be 16 bytes (AES-128), 24 bytes (AES-192) or * 32 bytes (AES-256). */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2400) /** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the * ARIA block cipher. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2406) /** Key for a cipher or MAC algorithm based on DES or 3DES (Triple-DES). * * The size of the key can be 64 bits (single DES), 128 bits (2-key 3DES) or * 192 bits (3-key 3DES). * * Note that single DES and 2-key 3DES are weak and strongly * deprecated and should only be used to decrypt legacy data. 3-key 3DES * is weak and deprecated and should only be used in legacy protocols. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2301) /** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the * Camellia block cipher. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2403) /** Key for the ChaCha20 stream cipher or the Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. * * ChaCha20 and the ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction are defined in RFC 7539. * * \note For ChaCha20 and ChaCha20_Poly1305, Mbed TLS only supports * 12-byte nonces. * * \note For ChaCha20, the initial counter value is 0. To encrypt or decrypt * with the initial counter value 1, you can process and discard a * 64-byte block before the real data. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2004) /** RSA public key. * * The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4001) /** RSA key pair (private and public key). * * The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7001) /** Whether a key type is an RSA key (pair or public-only). */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4100) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7100) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK ((psa_key_type_t) 0x00ff) /** Elliptic curve key pair. * * The size of an elliptic curve key is the bit size associated with the curve, * i.e. the bit size of *q* for a curve over a field *Fq*. * See the documentation of `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` curve families for details. * * \param curve A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that * identifies the ECC curve to be used. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (curve)) /** Elliptic curve public key. * * The size of an elliptic curve public key is the same as the corresponding * private key (see #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR and the documentation of * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` curve families). * * \param curve A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that * identifies the ECC curve to be used. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (curve)) /** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key (pair or public-only). */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) \ ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \ ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) /** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key pair. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type) \ (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE) /** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve public key. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) /** Extract the curve from an elliptic curve key type. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type) \ ((psa_ecc_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) ? \ ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) : \ 0)) /** Check if the curve of given family is Weierstrass elliptic curve. */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_IS_WEIERSTRASS(family) ((family & 0xc0) == 0) /** SEC Koblitz curves over prime fields. * * This family comprises the following curves: * secp192k1, secp224k1, secp256k1. * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x17) /** SEC random curves over prime fields. * * This family comprises the following curves: * secp192k1, secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1. * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x12) /* SECP160R2 (SEC2 v1, obsolete) */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x1b) /** SEC Koblitz curves over binary fields. * * This family comprises the following curves: * sect163k1, sect233k1, sect239k1, sect283k1, sect409k1, sect571k1. * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x27) /** SEC random curves over binary fields. * * This family comprises the following curves: * sect163r1, sect233r1, sect283r1, sect409r1, sect571r1. * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x22) /** SEC additional random curves over binary fields. * * This family comprises the following curve: * sect163r2. * It is defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x2b) /** Brainpool P random curves. * * This family comprises the following curves: * brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP256r1, * brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1. * It is defined in RFC 5639. */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x30) /** Curve25519 and Curve448. * * This family comprises the following Montgomery curves: * - 255-bit: Bernstein et al., * _Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records_, LNCS 3958, 2006. * The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X25519 when used with this curve. * - 448-bit: Hamburg, * _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015. * The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X448 when used with this curve. */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x41) /** The twisted Edwards curves Ed25519 and Ed448. * * These curves are suitable for EdDSA (#PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA for both curves, * #PSA_ALG_ED25519PH for the 255-bit curve, * #PSA_ALG_ED448PH for the 448-bit curve). * * This family comprises the following twisted Edwards curves: * - 255-bit: Edwards25519, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent * to Curve25519. * Bernstein et al., _Twisted Edwards curves_, Africacrypt 2008. * - 448-bit: Edwards448, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent * to Curve448. * Hamburg, _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015. */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x42) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4200) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7200) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK ((psa_key_type_t) 0x00ff) /** Diffie-Hellman key pair. * * \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the * Diffie-Hellman group to be used. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(group) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (group)) /** Diffie-Hellman public key. * * \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the * Diffie-Hellman group to be used. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(group) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (group)) /** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key (pair or public-only). */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) \ ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \ ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) /** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key pair. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(type) \ (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE) /** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman public key. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) /** Extract the group from a Diffie-Hellman key type. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY(type) \ ((psa_dh_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) ? \ ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) : \ 0)) /** Diffie-Hellman groups defined in RFC 7919 Appendix A. * * This family includes groups with the following key sizes (in bits): * 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192. A given implementation may support * all of these sizes or only a subset. */ #define PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x03) #define PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) \ (((type) >> 8) & 7) /** The block size of a block cipher. * * \param type A cipher key type (value of type #psa_key_type_t). * * \return The block size for a block cipher, or 1 for a stream cipher. * The return value is undefined if \p type is not a supported * cipher key type. * * \note It is possible to build stream cipher algorithms on top of a block * cipher, for example CTR mode (#PSA_ALG_CTR). * This macro only takes the key type into account, so it cannot be * used to determine the size of the data that #psa_cipher_update() * might buffer for future processing in general. * * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one. * * \warning This macro may evaluate its argument multiple times. */ #define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(type) \ (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \ 1u << PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) : \ 0u) /* Note that algorithm values are embedded in the persistent key store, * as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they must not be changed * (unless the storage format version changes). */ /** Vendor-defined algorithm flag. * * Algorithms defined by this standard will never have the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG * bit set. Vendors who define additional algorithms must use an encoding with * the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should respect the bitwise structure * used by standard encodings whenever practical. */ #define PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x80000000) #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x7f000000) #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000000) #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03000000) #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04000000) #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05000000) #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000000) #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000000) #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000000) #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x09000000) /** Whether an algorithm is vendor-defined. * * See also #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a symmetric cipher algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a symmetric cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER) /** Whether the specified algorithm is an authenticated encryption * with associated data (AEAD) algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD) /** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric signature algorithm, * also known as public-key signature algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric signature algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN) /** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, * also known as public-key encryption algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a key agreement algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a key derivation algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a key derivation algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a key stretching / password hashing * algorithm. * * A key stretching / password hashing algorithm is a key derivation algorithm * that is suitable for use with a low-entropy secret such as a password. * Equivalently, it's a key derivation algorithm that uses a * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input step. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a key stretching / password hashing algorithm, 0 * otherwise. This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a * supported algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) && \ (alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG) /** An invalid algorithm identifier value. */ /* *INDENT-OFF* (https://github.com/ARM-software/psa-arch-tests/issues/337) */ #define PSA_ALG_NONE ((psa_algorithm_t)0) /* *INDENT-ON* */ #define PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x000000ff) /** MD5 */ #define PSA_ALG_MD5 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000003) /** PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 */ #define PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000004) /** SHA1 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000005) /** SHA2-224 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000008) /** SHA2-256 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000009) /** SHA2-384 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000a) /** SHA2-512 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000b) /** SHA2-512/224 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000c) /** SHA2-512/256 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000d) /** SHA3-224 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000010) /** SHA3-256 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000011) /** SHA3-384 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000012) /** SHA3-512 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000013) /** The first 512 bits (64 bytes) of the SHAKE256 output. * * This is the prehashing for Ed448ph (see #PSA_ALG_ED448PH). For other * scenarios where a hash function based on SHA3/SHAKE is desired, SHA3-512 * has the same output size and a (theoretically) higher security strength. */ #define PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000015) /** In a hash-and-sign algorithm policy, allow any hash algorithm. * * This value may be used to form the algorithm usage field of a policy * for a signature algorithm that is parametrized by a hash. The key * may then be used to perform operations using the same signature * algorithm parametrized with any supported hash. * * That is, suppose that `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` is one of the following macros: * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT, * - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA, #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA. * Then you may create and use a key as follows: * - Set the key usage field using #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH, for example: * ``` * psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); // or VERIFY * psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)); * ``` * - Import or generate key material. * - Call psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(), passing * an algorithm built from `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` and a specific hash. Each * call to sign or verify a message may use a different hash. * ``` * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), ...); * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), ...); * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA3_256), ...); * ``` * * This value may not be used to build other algorithms that are * parametrized over a hash. For any valid use of this macro to build * an algorithm \c alg, #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(\c alg) is true. * * This value may not be used to build an algorithm specification to * perform an operation. It is only valid to build policies. */ #define PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x020000ff) #define PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00c00000) #define PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03800000) /** Macro to build an HMAC algorithm. * * For example, #PSA_ALG_HMAC(#PSA_ALG_SHA_256) is HMAC-SHA-256. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * * \return The corresponding HMAC algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) #define PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(hmac_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hmac_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** Whether the specified algorithm is an HMAC algorithm. * * HMAC is a family of MAC algorithms that are based on a hash function. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is an HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) \ (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \ PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE) /* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bits corresponding to * PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK encode the length to which the MAC is * truncated. As an exception, the value 0 means the untruncated algorithm, * whatever its length is. The length is encoded in 6 bits, so it can * reach up to 63; the largest MAC is 64 bytes so its trivial truncation * to full length is correctly encoded as 0 and any non-trivial truncation * is correctly encoded as a value between 1 and 63. */ #define PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x003f0000) #define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET 16 /* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bit corresponding to * #PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm * is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted * algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the * same base class and having a (potentially truncated) MAC length greater or * equal than the one encoded in #PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK. */ #define PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00008000) /** Macro to build a truncated MAC algorithm. * * A truncated MAC algorithm is identical to the corresponding MAC * algorithm except that the MAC value for the truncated algorithm * consists of only the first \p mac_length bytes of the MAC value * for the untruncated algorithm. * * \note This macro may allow constructing algorithm identifiers that * are not valid, either because the specified length is larger * than the untruncated MAC or because the specified length is * smaller than permitted by the implementation. * * \note It is implementation-defined whether a truncated MAC that * is truncated to the same length as the MAC of the untruncated * algorithm is considered identical to the untruncated algorithm * for policy comparison purposes. * * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) * is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated * MAC algorithm. * \param mac_length Desired length of the truncated MAC in bytes. * This must be at most the full length of the MAC * and must be at least an implementation-specified * minimum. The implementation-specified minimum * shall not be zero. * * \return The corresponding MAC algorithm with the specified * length. * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported * MAC algorithm or if \p mac_length is too small or * too large for the specified MAC algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, mac_length) \ (((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK | \ PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) | \ ((mac_length) << PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK)) /** Macro to build the base MAC algorithm corresponding to a truncated * MAC algorithm. * * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) * is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated * MAC algorithm. * * \return The corresponding base MAC algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported * MAC algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg) \ ((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK | \ PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) /** Length to which a MAC algorithm is truncated. * * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) * is true). * * \return Length of the truncated MAC in bytes. * \return 0 if \p mac_alg is a non-truncated MAC algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported * MAC algorithm. */ #define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(mac_alg) \ (((mac_alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK) >> PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET) /** Macro to build a MAC minimum-MAC-length wildcard algorithm. * * A minimum-MAC-length MAC wildcard algorithm permits all MAC algorithms * sharing the same base algorithm, and where the (potentially truncated) MAC * length of the specific algorithm is equal to or larger then the wildcard * algorithm's minimum MAC length. * * \note When setting the minimum required MAC length to less than the * smallest MAC length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively * becomes an 'any-MAC-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm. * * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) * is true). * \param min_mac_length Desired minimum length of the message authentication * code in bytes. This must be at most the untruncated * length of the MAC and must be at least 1. * * \return The corresponding MAC wildcard algorithm with the * specified minimum length. * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported MAC * algorithm or if \p min_mac_length is less than 1 or * too large for the specified MAC algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) \ (PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) | \ PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) #define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03c00000) /** The CBC-MAC construction over a block cipher * * \warning CBC-MAC is insecure in many cases. * A more secure mode, such as #PSA_ALG_CMAC, is recommended. */ #define PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03c00100) /** The CMAC construction over a block cipher */ #define PSA_ALG_CMAC ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03c00200) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) \ (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \ PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00800000) #define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00400000) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a stream cipher. * * A stream cipher is a symmetric cipher that encrypts or decrypts messages * by applying a bitwise-xor with a stream of bytes that is generated * from a key. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a stream cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier or if it is not a symmetric cipher algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(alg) \ (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG)) == \ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG)) /** The stream cipher mode of a stream cipher algorithm. * * The underlying stream cipher is determined by the key type. * - To use ChaCha20, use a key type of #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20. */ #define PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04800100) /** The CTR stream cipher mode. * * CTR is a stream cipher which is built from a block cipher. * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. * For example, to use AES-128-CTR, use this algorithm with * a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES and a length of 128 bits (16 bytes). */ #define PSA_ALG_CTR ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01000) /** The CFB stream cipher mode. * * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. */ #define PSA_ALG_CFB ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01100) /** The OFB stream cipher mode. * * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. */ #define PSA_ALG_OFB ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01200) /** The XTS cipher mode. * * XTS is a cipher mode which is built from a block cipher. It requires at * least one full block of input, but beyond this minimum the input * does not need to be a whole number of blocks. */ #define PSA_ALG_XTS ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0440ff00) /** The Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode of a block cipher, with no padding. * * \warning ECB mode does not protect the confidentiality of the encrypted data * except in extremely narrow circumstances. It is recommended that applications * only use ECB if they need to construct an operating mode that the * implementation does not provide. Implementations are encouraged to provide * the modes that applications need in preference to supporting direct access * to ECB. * * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. * * This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths are a * multiple of the block size of the chosen block cipher. * * ECB mode does not accept an initialization vector (IV). When using a * multi-part cipher operation with this algorithm, psa_cipher_generate_iv() * and psa_cipher_set_iv() must not be called. */ #define PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04404400) /** The CBC block cipher chaining mode, with no padding. * * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. * * This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths * are whole number of blocks for the chosen block cipher. */ #define PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04404000) /** The CBC block cipher chaining mode with PKCS#7 padding. * * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. * * This is the padding method defined by PKCS#7 (RFC 2315) §10.3. */ #define PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04404100) #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00400000) /** Whether the specified algorithm is an AEAD mode on a block cipher. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm which is an AEAD mode based on * a block cipher, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) \ (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG)) == \ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG)) /** The CCM authenticated encryption algorithm. * * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. */ #define PSA_ALG_CCM ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05500100) /** The CCM* cipher mode without authentication. * * This is CCM* as specified in IEEE 802.15.4 §7, with a tag length of 0. * For CCM* with a nonzero tag length, use the AEAD algorithm #PSA_ALG_CCM. * * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. * * Currently only 13-byte long IV's are supported. */ #define PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01300) /** The GCM authenticated encryption algorithm. * * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. */ #define PSA_ALG_GCM ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05500200) /** The Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. * * The ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction is defined in RFC 7539. * * Implementations must support 12-byte nonces, may support 8-byte nonces, * and should reject other sizes. * * Implementations must support 16-byte tags and should reject other sizes. */ #define PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05100500) /* In the encoding of an AEAD algorithm, the bits corresponding to * PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK encode the length of the AEAD tag. * The constants for default lengths follow this encoding. */ #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x003f0000) #define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET 16 /* In the encoding of an AEAD algorithm, the bit corresponding to * #PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm * is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted * algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the * same base class and having a tag length greater than or equal to the one * encoded in #PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK. */ #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00008000) /** Macro to build a shortened AEAD algorithm. * * A shortened AEAD algorithm is similar to the corresponding AEAD * algorithm, but has an authentication tag that consists of fewer bytes. * Depending on the algorithm, the tag length may affect the calculation * of the ciphertext. * * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) * is true). * \param tag_length Desired length of the authentication tag in bytes. * * \return The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the specified * length. * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported * AEAD algorithm or if \p tag_length is not valid * for the specified AEAD algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, tag_length) \ (((aead_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK | \ PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) | \ ((tag_length) << PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET & \ PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK)) /** Retrieve the tag length of a specified AEAD algorithm * * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) * is true). * * \return The tag length specified by the input algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported * AEAD algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(aead_alg) \ (((aead_alg) & PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK) >> \ PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET) /** Calculate the corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default tag length. * * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true). * * \return The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default * tag length for that algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg) \ ( \ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CCM) \ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_GCM) \ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) \ 0) #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, ref) \ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, 0) == \ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(ref, 0) ? \ ref : /** Macro to build an AEAD minimum-tag-length wildcard algorithm. * * A minimum-tag-length AEAD wildcard algorithm permits all AEAD algorithms * sharing the same base algorithm, and where the tag length of the specific * algorithm is equal to or larger then the minimum tag length specified by the * wildcard algorithm. * * \note When setting the minimum required tag length to less than the * smallest tag length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively * becomes an 'any-tag-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm. * * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type * #psa_algorithm_t such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true). * \param min_tag_length Desired minimum length of the authentication tag in * bytes. This must be at least 1 and at most the largest * allowed tag length of the algorithm. * * \return The corresponding AEAD wildcard algorithm with the * specified minimum length. * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported * AEAD algorithm or if \p min_tag_length is less than 1 * or too large for the specified AEAD algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) \ (PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) | \ PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000200) /** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature with hashing. * * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017 * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. * * \return The corresponding RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** Raw PKCS#1 v1.5 signature. * * The input to this algorithm is the DigestInfo structure used by * RFC 8017 (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications), §9.2 * steps 3–6. */ #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE #define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000300) #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06001300) /** RSA PSS signature with hashing. * * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017 * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name * RSASSA-PSS, with the message generation function MGF1, and with * a salt length equal to the length of the hash, or the largest * possible salt length for the algorithm and key size if that is * smaller than the hash length. The specified hash algorithm is * used to hash the input message, to create the salted hash, and * for the mask generation. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. * * \return The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** RSA PSS signature with hashing with relaxed verification. * * This algorithm has the same behavior as #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS when signing, * but allows an arbitrary salt length (including \c 0) when verifying a * signature. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. * * \return The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS with standard salt. * * \param alg An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard. * * \return 1 if \p alg is of the form * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(\c hash_alg), * where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or * #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not * a supported algorithm identifier or policy. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE) /** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS with any salt. * * \param alg An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard. * * \return 1 if \p alg is of the form * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE(\c hash_alg), * where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or * #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not * a supported algorithm identifier or policy. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE) /** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS. * * This includes any of the RSA PSS algorithm variants, regardless of the * constraints on salt length. * * \param alg An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard. * * \return 1 if \p alg is of the form * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(\c hash_alg) or * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE(\c hash_alg), * where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or * #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not * a supported algorithm identifier or policy. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg) || \ PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg)) #define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000600) /** ECDSA signature with hashing. * * This is the ECDSA signature scheme defined by ANSI X9.62, * with a random per-message secret number (*k*). * * The representation of the signature as a byte string consists of * the concatenation of the signature values *r* and *s*. Each of * *r* and *s* is encoded as an *N*-octet string, where *N* is the length * of the base point of the curve in octets. Each value is represented * in big-endian order (most significant octet first). * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. * * \return The corresponding ECDSA signature algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** ECDSA signature without hashing. * * This is the same signature scheme as #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(), but * without specifying a hash algorithm. This algorithm may only be * used to sign or verify a sequence of bytes that should be an * already-calculated hash. Note that the input is padded with * zeros on the left or truncated on the left as required to fit * the curve size. */ #define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE #define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000700) /** Deterministic ECDSA signature with hashing. * * This is the deterministic ECDSA signature scheme defined by RFC 6979. * * The representation of a signature is the same as with #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(). * * Note that when this algorithm is used for verification, signatures * made with randomized ECDSA (#PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg)) with the * same private key are accepted. In other words, * #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) differs from * #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) only for signature, not for verification. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. * * \return The corresponding deterministic ECDSA signature * algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) #define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00000100) #define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \ PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0) #define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) #define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) /** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm without prehashing (PureEdDSA), * using standard parameters. * * Contexts are not supported in the current version of this specification * because there is no suitable signature interface that can take the * context as a parameter. A future version of this specification may add * suitable functions and extend this algorithm to support contexts. * * PureEdDSA requires an elliptic curve key on a twisted Edwards curve. * In this specification, the following curves are supported: * - #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 255-bit: Ed25519 as specified * in RFC 8032. * The curve is Edwards25519. * The hash function used internally is SHA-512. * - #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 448-bit: Ed448 as specified * in RFC 8032. * The curve is Edwards448. * The hash function used internally is the first 114 bytes of the * SHAKE256 output. * * This algorithm can be used with psa_sign_message() and * psa_verify_message(). Since there is no prehashing, it cannot be used * with psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(). * * The signature format is the concatenation of R and S as defined by * RFC 8032 §5.1.6 and §5.2.6 (a 64-byte string for Ed25519, a 114-byte * string for Ed448). */ #define PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000800) #define PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000900) #define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE) /** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with prehashing (HashEdDSA), * using SHA-512 and the Edwards25519 curve. * * See #PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA regarding context support and the signature format. * * This algorithm is Ed25519 as specified in RFC 8032. * The curve is Edwards25519. * The prehash is SHA-512. * The hash function used internally is SHA-512. * * This is a hash-and-sign algorithm: to calculate a signature, * you can either: * - call psa_sign_message() on the message; * - or calculate the SHA-512 hash of the message * with psa_hash_compute() * or with a multi-part hash operation started with psa_hash_setup(), * using the hash algorithm #PSA_ALG_SHA_512, * then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash(). * Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or * psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function. */ #define PSA_ALG_ED25519PH \ (PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE | (PSA_ALG_SHA_512 & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with prehashing (HashEdDSA), * using SHAKE256 and the Edwards448 curve. * * See #PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA regarding context support and the signature format. * * This algorithm is Ed448 as specified in RFC 8032. * The curve is Edwards448. * The prehash is the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output. * The hash function used internally is the first 114 bytes of the * SHAKE256 output. * * This is a hash-and-sign algorithm: to calculate a signature, * you can either: * - call psa_sign_message() on the message; * - or calculate the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output of the message * with psa_hash_compute() * or with a multi-part hash operation started with psa_hash_setup(), * using the hash algorithm #PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512, * then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash(). * Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or * psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function. */ #define PSA_ALG_ED448PH \ (PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE | (PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /* Default definition, to be overridden if the library is extended with * more hash-and-sign algorithms that we want to keep out of this header * file. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) 0 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used * with psa_sign_hash() and psa_verify_hash(). * * This encompasses all strict hash-and-sign algorithms categorized by * PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(), as well as algorithms that follow the * paradigm more loosely: * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW (expects its input to be an encoded hash) * - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY (doesn't specify what kind of hash the input is) * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a * hash. 0 if alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used * to sign a message. 0 if alg is not a signature algorithm. * This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a * supported algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || \ PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) || \ PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg)) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used * with psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message(). * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a * message. 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used * to sign an already-calculated hash. 0 if \p alg is not a signature * algorithm. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a * supported algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) || (alg) == PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash-and-sign algorithm. * * Hash-and-sign algorithms are asymmetric (public-key) signature algorithms * structured in two parts: first the calculation of a hash in a way that * does not depend on the key, then the calculation of a signature from the * hash value and the key. Hash-and-sign algorithms encode the hash * used for the hashing step, and you can call #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH * to extract this algorithm. * * Thus, for a hash-and-sign algorithm, * `psa_sign_message(key, alg, input, ...)` is equivalent to * ``` * psa_hash_compute(PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg), input, ..., hash, ...); * psa_sign_hash(key, alg, hash, ..., signature, ...); * ``` * Most usefully, separating the hash from the signature allows the hash * to be calculated in multiple steps with psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update() * and psa_hash_finish(). Likewise psa_verify_message() is equivalent to * calculating the hash and then calling psa_verify_hash(). * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash-and-sign algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) && \ ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) != 0) /** Get the hash used by a hash-and-sign signature algorithm. * * A hash-and-sign algorithm is a signature algorithm which is * composed of two phases: first a hashing phase which does not use * the key and produces a hash of the input message, then a signing * phase which only uses the hash and the key and not the message * itself. * * \param alg A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(\p alg) is true). * * \return The underlying hash algorithm if \p alg is a hash-and-sign * algorithm. * \return 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that does not * follow the hash-and-sign structure. * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a signature algorithm or * if it is not supported by the implementation. */ #define PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \ ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \ 0) /** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption. */ #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000200) #define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000300) /** RSA OAEP encryption. * * This is the encryption scheme defined by RFC 8017 * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name * RSAES-OAEP, with the message generation function MGF1. * * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true) to use * for MGF1. * * \return The corresponding RSA OAEP encryption algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) #define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ? \ ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \ 0) #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000100) /** Macro to build an HKDF algorithm. * * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is HKDF using HMAC-SHA-256. * * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs: * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt used in the "extract" step. * It is optional; if omitted, the derivation uses an empty salt. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key used in the "extract" step. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string used in the "expand" step. * You must pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT before #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET. * You may pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO at any time after steup and before * starting to generate output. * * \warning HKDF processes the salt as follows: first hash it with hash_alg * if the salt is longer than the block size of the hash algorithm; then * pad with null bytes up to the block size. As a result, it is possible * for distinct salt inputs to result in the same outputs. To ensure * unique outputs, it is recommended to use a fixed length for salt values. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * * \return The corresponding HKDF algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_HKDF(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF algorithm. * * HKDF is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based on a hash * function and the HMAC construction. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported * key derivation algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000400) /** Macro to build an HKDF-Extract algorithm. * * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is * HKDF-Extract using HMAC-SHA-256. * * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs: * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt. * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the input keying material used in the * "extract" step. * The inputs are mandatory and must be passed in the order above. * Each input may only be passed once. * * \warning HKDF-Extract is not meant to be used on its own. PSA_ALG_HKDF * should be used instead if possible. PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT is provided * as a separate algorithm for the sake of protocols that use it as a * building block. It may also be a slight performance optimization * in applications that use HKDF with the same salt and key but many * different info strings. * * \warning HKDF processes the salt as follows: first hash it with hash_alg * if the salt is longer than the block size of the hash algorithm; then * pad with null bytes up to the block size. As a result, it is possible * for distinct salt inputs to result in the same outputs. To ensure * unique outputs, it is recommended to use a fixed length for salt values. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * * \return The corresponding HKDF-Extract algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF-Extract algorithm. * * HKDF-Extract is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based * on a hash function and the HMAC construction. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF-Extract algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported * key derivation algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000500) /** Macro to build an HKDF-Expand algorithm. * * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is * HKDF-Expand using HMAC-SHA-256. * * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs: * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the pseudorandom key (PRK). * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string. * * The inputs are mandatory and must be passed in the order above. * Each input may only be passed once. * * \warning HKDF-Expand is not meant to be used on its own. `PSA_ALG_HKDF` * should be used instead if possible. `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND` is provided as * a separate algorithm for the sake of protocols that use it as a building * block. It may also be a slight performance optimization in applications * that use HKDF with the same salt and key but many different info strings. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * * \return The corresponding HKDF-Expand algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF-Expand algorithm. * * HKDF-Expand is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based * on a hash function and the HMAC construction. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF-Expand algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported * key derivation algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE) /** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF or HKDF-Extract or * HKDF-Expand algorithm. * * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \c alg is any HKDF type algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported * key derivation algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE || \ ((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE || \ ((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000200) /** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. * * TLS 1.2 uses a custom pseudorandom function (PRF) for key schedule, * specified in Section 5 of RFC 5246. It is based on HMAC and can be * used with either SHA-256 or SHA-384. * * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be * passed in the order given here: * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label. * * For the application to TLS-1.2 key expansion, the seed is the * concatenation of ServerHello.Random + ClientHello.Random, * and the label is "key expansion". * * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` represents the * TLS 1.2 PRF using HMAC-SHA-256. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * * \return The corresponding TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported * key derivation algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000300) /** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MasterSecret algorithm. * * In a pure-PSK handshake in TLS 1.2, the master secret is derived * from the PreSharedKey (PSK) through the application of padding * (RFC 4279, Section 2) and the TLS-1.2 PRF (RFC 5246, Section 5). * The latter is based on HMAC and can be used with either SHA-256 * or SHA-384. * * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be * passed in the order given here: * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET is the other secret for the * computation of the premaster secret. This input is optional; * if omitted, it defaults to a string of null bytes with the same length * as the secret (PSK) input. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label. * * For the application to TLS-1.2, the seed (which is * forwarded to the TLS-1.2 PRF) is the concatenation of the * ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random, * the label is "master secret" or "extended master secret" and * the other secret depends on the key exchange specified in the cipher suite: * - for a plain PSK cipher suite (RFC 4279, Section 2), omit * PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET * - for a DHE-PSK (RFC 4279, Section 3) or ECDHE-PSK cipher suite * (RFC 5489, Section 2), the other secret should be the output of the * PSA_ALG_FFDH or PSA_ALG_ECDH key agreement performed with the peer. * The recommended way to pass this input is to use a key derivation * algorithm constructed as * PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg)) * and to call psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(). Alternatively, * this input may be an output of `psa_raw_key_agreement()` passed with * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(), or an equivalent input passed with * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_input_key(). * - for a RSA-PSK cipher suite (RFC 4279, Section 4), the other secret * should be the 48-byte client challenge (the PreMasterSecret of * (RFC 5246, Section 7.4.7.1)) concatenation of the TLS version and * a 46-byte random string chosen by the client. On the server, this is * typically an output of psa_asymmetric_decrypt() using * PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, passed to the key derivation operation * with `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`. * * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` represents the * TLS-1.2 PSK to MasterSecret derivation PRF using HMAC-SHA-256. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * * \return The corresponding TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported * key derivation algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /* The TLS 1.2 ECJPAKE-to-PMS KDF. It takes the shared secret K (an EC point * in case of EC J-PAKE) and calculates SHA256(K.X) that the rest of TLS 1.2 * will use to derive the session secret, as defined by step 2 of * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01#section-8.7. * Uses PSA_ALG_SHA_256. * This function takes a single input: * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the shared secret K from EC J-PAKE. * The only supported curve is secp256r1 (the 256-bit curve in * #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1), so the input must be exactly 65 bytes. * The output has to be read as a single chunk of 32 bytes, defined as * PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE. */ #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000609) /* This flag indicates whether the key derivation algorithm is suitable for * use on low-entropy secrets such as password - these algorithms are also * known as key stretching or password hashing schemes. These are also the * algorithms that accepts inputs of type #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD. * * Those algorithms cannot be combined with a key agreement algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00800000) #define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08800100) /** Macro to build a PBKDF2-HMAC password hashing / key stretching algorithm. * * PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2). * This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using a PRF based on * HMAC with the specified hash. * For example, `PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` specifies PBKDF2 * using the PRF HMAC-SHA-256. * * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be * provided in the following order: * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST is the iteration count. * This input step must be used exactly once. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt. * This input step must be used one or more times; if used several times, the * inputs will be concatenated. This can be used to build the final salt * from multiple sources, both public and secret (also known as pepper). * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD is the password to be hashed. * This input step must be used exactly once. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * * \return The corresponding PBKDF2-HMAC-XXX algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \c alg is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported * key derivation algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_GET_HASH(pbkdf2_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((pbkdf2_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** The PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128 password hashing / key stretching algorithm. * * PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2). * This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using the * AES-CMAC-PRF-128 PRF specified by RFC 4615. * * This key derivation algorithm uses the same inputs as * #PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC() with the same constraints. */ #define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08800200) #define PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2(kdf_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg) || \ ((kdf_alg) == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128)) #define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0xfe00ffff) #define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0xffff0000) /** Macro to build a combined algorithm that chains a key agreement with * a key derivation. * * \param ka_alg A key agreement algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such * that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p ka_alg) is true). * \param kdf_alg A key derivation algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such * that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p kdf_alg) is true). * * \return The corresponding key agreement and derivation * algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p ka_alg is not a supported * key agreement algorithm or \p kdf_alg is not a * supported key derivation algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, kdf_alg) \ ((ka_alg) | (kdf_alg)) #define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) #define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a raw key agreement algorithm. * * A raw key agreement algorithm is one that does not specify * a key derivation function. * Usually, raw key agreement algorithms are constructed directly with * a \c PSA_ALG_xxx macro while non-raw key agreement algorithms are * constructed with #PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(). * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a raw key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) && \ PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) #define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_OR_AGREEMENT(alg) \ ((PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg))) /** The finite-field Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement algorithm. * * The shared secret produced by key agreement is * `g^{ab}` in big-endian format. * It is `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where `m` is the size of the prime `p` * in bits. */ #define PSA_ALG_FFDH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x09010000) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm. * * This includes the raw finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as * finite-field Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation * algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \c alg is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported * key agreement algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_FFDH(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_FFDH) /** The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm. * * The shared secret produced by key agreement is the x-coordinate of * the shared secret point. It is always `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where * `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of the * order of the curve's coordinate field. When `m` is not a multiple of 8, * the byte containing the most significant bit of the shared secret * is padded with zero bits. The byte order is either little-endian * or big-endian depending on the curve type. * * - For Montgomery curves (curve types `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_CURVEXXX`), * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A` * in little-endian byte order. * The bit size is 448 for Curve448 and 255 for Curve25519. * - For Weierstrass curves over prime fields (curve types * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECPXXX` and `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`), * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A` * in big-endian byte order. * The bit size is `m = ceiling(log_2(p))` for the field `F_p`. * - For Weierstrass curves over binary fields (curve types * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECTXXX`), * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A` * in big-endian byte order. * The bit size is `m` for the field `F_{2^m}`. */ #define PSA_ALG_ECDH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x09020000) /** Whether the specified algorithm is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman * algorithm. * * This includes the raw elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as * elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation * algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \c alg is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm, * 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported * key agreement algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_ECDH) /** Whether the specified algorithm encoding is a wildcard. * * Wildcard values may only be used to set the usage algorithm field in * a policy, not to perform an operation. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \c alg is a wildcard algorithm encoding. * \return 0 if \c alg is a non-wildcard algorithm encoding (suitable for * an operation). * \return This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \ PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH : \ PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) ? \ (alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 : \ PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) ? \ (alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 : \ (alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) /** Get the hash used by a composite algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return The underlying hash algorithm if alg is a composite algorithm that * uses a hash algorithm. * * \return \c 0 if alg is not a composite algorithm that uses a hash. */ #define PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg) \ (((alg) & 0x000000ff) == 0 ? ((psa_algorithm_t) 0) : 0x02000000 | ((alg) & 0x000000ff)) /**@}*/ /** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes * @{ */ /* Note that location and persistence level values are embedded in the * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes). */ /** The default lifetime for volatile keys. * * A volatile key only exists as long as the identifier to it is not destroyed. * The key material is guaranteed to be erased on a power reset. * * A key with this lifetime is typically stored in the RAM area of the * PSA Crypto subsystem. However this is an implementation choice. * If an implementation stores data about the key in a non-volatile memory, * it must release all the resources associated with the key and erase the * key material if the calling application terminates. */ #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ((psa_key_lifetime_t) 0x00000000) /** The default lifetime for persistent keys. * * A persistent key remains in storage until it is explicitly destroyed or * until the corresponding storage area is wiped. This specification does * not define any mechanism to wipe a storage area, but integrations may * provide their own mechanism (for example to perform a factory reset, * to prepare for device refurbishment, or to uninstall an application). * * This lifetime value is the default storage area for the calling * application. Integrations of Mbed TLS may support other persistent lifetimes. * See ::psa_key_lifetime_t for more information. */ #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT ((psa_key_lifetime_t) 0x00000001) /** The persistence level of volatile keys. * * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. */ #define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0x00) /** The default persistence level for persistent keys. * * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. */ #define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0x01) /** A persistence level indicating that a key is never destroyed. * * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. */ #define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0xff) #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) \ ((psa_key_persistence_t) ((lifetime) & 0x000000ff)) #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime) \ ((psa_key_location_t) ((lifetime) >> 8)) /** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is volatile. * * A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when * the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key * is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device. * * A key that is not volatile is persistent. Persistent keys are * preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an * implementation-specific device management event occurs (for example, * a factory reset). * * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query (value of type * ::psa_key_lifetime_t). * * \return \c 1 if the key is volatile, otherwise \c 0. */ #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime) \ (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \ PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE) /** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is read-only. * * Read-only keys cannot be created or destroyed through the PSA Crypto API. * They must be created through platform-specific means that bypass the API. * * Some platforms may offer ways to destroy read-only keys. For example, * consider a platform with multiple levels of privilege, where a * low-privilege application can use a key but is not allowed to destroy * it, and the platform exposes the key to the application with a read-only * lifetime. High-privilege code can destroy the key even though the * application sees the key as read-only. * * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query (value of type * ::psa_key_lifetime_t). * * \return \c 1 if the key is read-only, otherwise \c 0. */ #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY(lifetime) \ (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \ PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY) /** Construct a lifetime from a persistence level and a location. * * \param persistence The persistence level * (value of type ::psa_key_persistence_t). * \param location The location indicator * (value of type ::psa_key_location_t). * * \return The constructed lifetime value. */ #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(persistence, location) \ ((location) << 8 | (persistence)) /** The local storage area for persistent keys. * * This storage area is available on all systems that can store persistent * keys without delegating the storage to a third-party cryptoprocessor. * * See ::psa_key_location_t for more information. */ #define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ((psa_key_location_t) 0x000000) #define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_key_location_t) 0x800000) /* Note that key identifier values are embedded in the * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes). */ /** The null key identifier. */ /* *INDENT-OFF* (https://github.com/ARM-software/psa-arch-tests/issues/337) */ #define PSA_KEY_ID_NULL ((psa_key_id_t)0) /* *INDENT-ON* */ /** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the application. */ #define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN ((psa_key_id_t) 0x00000001) /** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the application. */ #define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX ((psa_key_id_t) 0x3fffffff) /** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation. */ #define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN ((psa_key_id_t) 0x40000000) /** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation. */ #define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX ((psa_key_id_t) 0x7fffffff) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ((psa_key_id_t) 0) #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(id) (id) #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(id) (0) /** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime. * * \param unused Unused parameter. * \param key_id Identifier of the key. */ static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( unsigned int unused, psa_key_id_t key_id) { (void) unused; return key_id; } /** Compare two key identifiers. * * \param id1 First key identifier. * \param id2 Second key identifier. * * \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise. */ static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2) { return id1 == id2; } /** Check whether a key identifier is null. * * \param key Key identifier. * * \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise. */ static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) { return key == 0; } #else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ((mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ 0, 0 }) #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(id) ((id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id)) #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(id) ((id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner)) /** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime. * * \param owner_id Identifier of the key owner. * \param key_id Identifier of the key. */ static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner_id, psa_key_id_t key_id) { return (mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ .MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) = key_id, .MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner) = owner_id }; } /** Compare two key identifiers. * * \param id1 First key identifier. * \param id2 Second key identifier. * * \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise. */ static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2) { return (id1.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) == id2.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id)) && mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal(id1.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner), id2.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner)); } /** Check whether a key identifier is null. * * \param key Key identifier. * * \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise. */ static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) { return key.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) == 0; } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ /**@}*/ /** \defgroup policy Key policies * @{ */ /* Note that key usage flags are embedded in the * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes). */ /** Whether the key may be exported. * * A public key or the public part of a key pair may always be exported * regardless of the value of this permission flag. * * If a key does not have export permission, implementations shall not * allow the key to be exported in plain form from the cryptoprocessor, * whether through psa_export_key() or through a proprietary interface. * The key may however be exportable in a wrapped form, i.e. in a form * where it is encrypted by another key. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000001) /** Whether the key may be copied. * * This flag allows the use of psa_copy_key() to make a copy of the key * with the same policy or a more restrictive policy. * * For lifetimes for which the key is located in a secure element which * enforce the non-exportability of keys, copying a key outside the secure * element also requires the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT. * Copying the key inside the secure element is permitted with just * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY if the secure element supports it. * For keys with the lifetime #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY * is sufficient to permit the copy. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000002) /** Whether the key may be used to encrypt a message. * * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric encryption operation, * for an AEAD encryption-and-authentication operation, * or for an asymmetric encryption operation, * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. * * For a key pair, this concerns the public key. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000100) /** Whether the key may be used to decrypt a message. * * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric decryption operation, * for an AEAD decryption-and-verification operation, * or for an asymmetric decryption operation, * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. * * For a key pair, this concerns the private key. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000200) /** Whether the key may be used to sign a message. * * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation or for * an asymmetric message signature operation, if otherwise permitted by the * key’s type and policy. * * For a key pair, this concerns the private key. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000400) /** Whether the key may be used to verify a message. * * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation or for * an asymmetric message signature verification operation, if otherwise * permitted by the key’s type and policy. * * For a key pair, this concerns the public key. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000800) /** Whether the key may be used to sign a message. * * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation * or for an asymmetric signature operation, * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. * * For a key pair, this concerns the private key. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00001000) /** Whether the key may be used to verify a message signature. * * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation * or for an asymmetric signature verification operation, * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. * * For a key pair, this concerns the public key. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00002000) /** Whether the key may be used to derive other keys or produce a password * hash. * * This flag allows the key to be used for a key derivation operation or for * a key agreement operation, if otherwise permitted by the key's type and * policy. * * If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to * psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key derivation operation, then it * permits calling psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() or * psa_key_derivation_output_key() at the end of the operation. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00004000) /** Whether the key may be used to verify the result of a key derivation, * including password hashing. * * This flag allows the key to be used: * * This flag allows the key to be used in a key derivation operation, if * otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. * * If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to * psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key derivation operation, then it * permits calling psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() or * psa_key_derivation_verify_key() at the end of the operation. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00008000) /**@}*/ /** \defgroup derivation Key derivation * @{ */ /* Key input steps are not embedded in the persistent storage, so you can * change them if needed: it's only an ABI change. */ /** A secret input for key derivation. * * This should be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE * (passed to psa_key_derivation_input_key()) * or the shared secret resulting from a key agreement * (obtained via psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()). * * The secret can also be a direct input (passed to * key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation * may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(), * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), or * psa_key_derivation_verify_key(), but not * psa_key_derivation_output_key(). */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0101) /** A low-entropy secret input for password hashing / key stretching. * * This is usually a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD (passed to * psa_key_derivation_input_key()) or a direct input (passed to * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()) that is a password or passphrase. It can * also be high-entropy secret such as a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE or * the shared secret resulting from a key agreement. * * The secret can also be a direct input (passed to * key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation * may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(), * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), or * psa_key_derivation_verify_key(), but not * psa_key_derivation_output_key(). */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0102) /** A high-entropy additional secret input for key derivation. * * This is typically the shared secret resulting from a key agreement obtained * via `psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()`. It may alternatively be a key of * type `PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE` passed to `psa_key_derivation_input_key()`, or * a direct input passed to `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`. */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET \ ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0103) /** A label for key derivation. * * This should be a direct input. * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0201) /** A salt for key derivation. * * This should be a direct input. * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA or * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER. */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0202) /** An information string for key derivation. * * This should be a direct input. * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0203) /** A seed for key derivation. * * This should be a direct input. * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0204) /** A cost parameter for password hashing / key stretching. * * This must be a direct input, passed to psa_key_derivation_input_integer(). */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0205) /**@}*/ /** \defgroup helper_macros Helper macros * @{ */ /* Helper macros */ /** Check if two AEAD algorithm identifiers refer to the same AEAD algorithm * regardless of the tag length they encode. * * \param aead_alg_1 An AEAD algorithm identifier. * \param aead_alg_2 An AEAD algorithm identifier. * * \return 1 if both identifiers refer to the same AEAD algorithm, * 0 otherwise. * Unspecified if neither \p aead_alg_1 nor \p aead_alg_2 are * a supported AEAD algorithm. */ #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(aead_alg_1, aead_alg_2) \ (!(((aead_alg_1) ^ (aead_alg_2)) & \ ~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG))) /**@}*/ /**@}*/ /** \defgroup interruptible Interruptible operations * @{ */ /** Maximum value for use with \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to determine * the maximum number of ops allowed to be executed by an interruptible * function in a single call. */ #define PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED UINT32_MAX /**@}*/ #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H */