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572 lines
20 KiB
C
572 lines
20 KiB
C
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/*
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* PSA PAKE layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto
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*/
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/*
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* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
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*/
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#include "common.h"
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
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#include <psa/crypto.h>
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#include "psa_crypto_core.h"
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#include "psa_crypto_pake.h"
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#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h"
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#include <mbedtls/ecjpake.h>
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#include "psa_util_internal.h"
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#include <mbedtls/platform.h>
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#include <mbedtls/error.h>
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#include <string.h>
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/*
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* State sequence:
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*
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* psa_pake_setup()
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* |
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* |-- In any order:
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* | | psa_pake_set_password_key()
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* | | psa_pake_set_user()
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* | | psa_pake_set_peer()
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* | | psa_pake_set_role()
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* |
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* |--- In any order: (First round input before or after first round output)
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* | |
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* | |------ In Order
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* | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE)
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* | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC)
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* | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF)
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* | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE)
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* | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC)
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* | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF)
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* | |
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* | |------ In Order:
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* | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE)
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* | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC)
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* | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF)
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* | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE)
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* | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC)
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* | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF)
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* |
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* |--- In any order: (Second round input before or after second round output)
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* | |
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* | |------ In Order
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* | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE)
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* | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC)
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* | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF)
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* | |
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* | |------ In Order:
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* | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE)
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* | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC)
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* | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF)
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* |
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* psa_pake_get_implicit_key()
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* psa_pake_abort()
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*/
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/*
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* Possible sequence of calls to implementation:
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*
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* |--- In any order:
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* | |
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* | |------ In Order
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* | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE)
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* | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC)
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* | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF)
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* | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE)
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* | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC)
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* | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF)
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* | |
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* | |------ In Order:
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* | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE)
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* | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC)
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* | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF)
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* | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE)
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* | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC)
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* | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF)
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* |
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* |--- In any order:
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* | |
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* | |------ In Order
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* | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE)
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* | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC)
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* | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PROOF)
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* | |
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* | |------ In Order:
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* | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_KEY_SHARE)
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* | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC)
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* | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PROOF)
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*/
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
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static psa_status_t mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(int ret)
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{
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switch (ret) {
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case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA:
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case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA:
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case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY:
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case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED:
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return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID;
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case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
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case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
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return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
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case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:
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return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
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case MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED:
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return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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default:
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return PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
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}
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}
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE)
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
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static psa_status_t psa_pake_ecjpake_setup(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation)
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{
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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mbedtls_ecjpake_init(&operation->ctx.jpake);
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ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(&operation->ctx.jpake,
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operation->role,
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MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
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MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1,
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operation->password,
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operation->password_len);
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mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->password, operation->password_len);
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if (ret != 0) {
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return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret);
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}
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return PSA_SUCCESS;
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}
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#endif
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/* The only two JPAKE user/peer identifiers supported in built-in implementation. */
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static const uint8_t jpake_server_id[] = { 's', 'e', 'r', 'v', 'e', 'r' };
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static const uint8_t jpake_client_id[] = { 'c', 'l', 'i', 'e', 'n', 't' };
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psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_setup(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
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const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs)
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{
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psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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size_t user_len = 0, peer_len = 0, password_len = 0;
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uint8_t *peer = NULL, *user = NULL;
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size_t actual_user_len = 0, actual_peer_len = 0, actual_password_len = 0;
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psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init();
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status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password_len(inputs, &password_len);
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if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
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return status;
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}
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status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user_len(inputs, &user_len);
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if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
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return status;
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}
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status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer_len(inputs, &peer_len);
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if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
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return status;
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}
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status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_cipher_suite(inputs, &cipher_suite);
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if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
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return status;
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}
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operation->password = mbedtls_calloc(1, password_len);
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if (operation->password == NULL) {
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status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
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goto error;
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}
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user = mbedtls_calloc(1, user_len);
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if (user == NULL) {
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status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
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goto error;
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}
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peer = mbedtls_calloc(1, peer_len);
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if (peer == NULL) {
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status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
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goto error;
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}
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status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password(inputs, operation->password,
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password_len, &actual_password_len);
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if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
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goto error;
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}
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status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user(inputs, user,
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user_len, &actual_user_len);
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if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
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goto error;
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}
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status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer(inputs, peer,
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peer_len, &actual_peer_len);
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if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
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goto error;
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}
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operation->password_len = actual_password_len;
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operation->alg = cipher_suite.algorithm;
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
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if (cipher_suite.algorithm == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) {
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if (cipher_suite.type != PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC ||
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cipher_suite.family != PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ||
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cipher_suite.bits != 256 ||
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cipher_suite.hash != PSA_ALG_SHA_256) {
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status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
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goto error;
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}
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const size_t user_peer_len = sizeof(jpake_client_id); // client and server have the same length
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if (actual_user_len != user_peer_len ||
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actual_peer_len != user_peer_len) {
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status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
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goto error;
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}
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if (memcmp(user, jpake_client_id, actual_user_len) == 0 &&
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memcmp(peer, jpake_server_id, actual_peer_len) == 0) {
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operation->role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT;
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} else
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if (memcmp(user, jpake_server_id, actual_user_len) == 0 &&
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memcmp(peer, jpake_client_id, actual_peer_len) == 0) {
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operation->role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER;
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} else {
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status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
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goto error;
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}
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operation->buffer_length = 0;
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operation->buffer_offset = 0;
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status = psa_pake_ecjpake_setup(operation);
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if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
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goto error;
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}
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/* Role has been set, release user/peer buffers. */
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mbedtls_free(user); mbedtls_free(peer);
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return PSA_SUCCESS;
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} else
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#else
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(void) operation;
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(void) inputs;
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#endif
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{ status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; }
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error:
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mbedtls_free(user); mbedtls_free(peer);
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/* In case of failure of the setup of a multipart operation, the PSA driver interface
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* specifies that the core does not call any other driver entry point thus does not
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* call mbedtls_psa_pake_abort(). Therefore call it here to do the needed clean
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* up like freeing the memory that may have been allocated to store the password.
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*/
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mbedtls_psa_pake_abort(operation);
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return status;
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}
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static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_output_internal(
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mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
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psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step,
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uint8_t *output,
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size_t output_size,
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size_t *output_length)
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{
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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size_t length;
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(void) step; // Unused parameter
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
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/*
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* The PSA CRYPTO PAKE and MbedTLS JPAKE API have a different
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* handling of output sequencing.
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*
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* The MbedTLS JPAKE API outputs the whole X1+X2 and X2S steps data
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* at once, on the other side the PSA CRYPTO PAKE api requires
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* the KEY_SHARE/ZP_PUBLIC/ZK_PROOF parts of X1, X2 & X2S to be
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* retrieved in sequence.
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*
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* In order to achieve API compatibility, the whole X1+X2 or X2S steps
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* data is stored in an intermediate buffer at first step output call,
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* and data is sliced down by parsing the ECPoint records in order
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* to return the right parts on each step.
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*/
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if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) {
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/* Initialize & write round on KEY_SHARE sequences */
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if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE) {
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ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&operation->ctx.jpake,
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operation->buffer,
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sizeof(operation->buffer),
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&operation->buffer_length,
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mbedtls_psa_get_random,
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MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE);
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if (ret != 0) {
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return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret);
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}
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operation->buffer_offset = 0;
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} else if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE) {
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ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(&operation->ctx.jpake,
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operation->buffer,
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sizeof(operation->buffer),
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&operation->buffer_length,
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mbedtls_psa_get_random,
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MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE);
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if (ret != 0) {
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return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret);
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}
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operation->buffer_offset = 0;
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}
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/*
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* mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_xxx() outputs thing in the format
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* defined by draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01 section 7. The summary is
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* that the data for each step is prepended with a length byte, and
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* then they're concatenated. Additionally, the server's second round
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* output is prepended with a 3-bytes ECParameters structure.
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*
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* In PSA, we output each step separately, and don't prepend the
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* output with a length byte, even less a curve identifier, as that
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* information is already available.
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*/
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if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE &&
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operation->role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER) {
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/* Skip ECParameters, with is 3 bytes (RFC 8422) */
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operation->buffer_offset += 3;
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}
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/* Read the length byte then move past it to the data */
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length = operation->buffer[operation->buffer_offset];
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operation->buffer_offset += 1;
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if (operation->buffer_offset + length > operation->buffer_length) {
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return PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT;
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}
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if (output_size < length) {
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return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
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}
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memcpy(output,
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operation->buffer + operation->buffer_offset,
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length);
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*output_length = length;
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operation->buffer_offset += length;
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/* Reset buffer after ZK_PROOF sequence */
|
||
|
if ((step == PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF) ||
|
||
|
(step == PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PROOF)) {
|
||
|
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->buffer, sizeof(operation->buffer));
|
||
|
operation->buffer_length = 0;
|
||
|
operation->buffer_offset = 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return PSA_SUCCESS;
|
||
|
} else
|
||
|
#else
|
||
|
(void) step;
|
||
|
(void) output;
|
||
|
(void) output_size;
|
||
|
(void) output_length;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
{ return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; }
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_output(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
|
||
|
psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step,
|
||
|
uint8_t *output,
|
||
|
size_t output_size,
|
||
|
size_t *output_length)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_pake_output_internal(
|
||
|
operation, step, output, output_size, output_length);
|
||
|
|
||
|
return status;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_input_internal(
|
||
|
mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
|
||
|
psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step,
|
||
|
const uint8_t *input,
|
||
|
size_t input_length)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
|
(void) step; // Unused parameter
|
||
|
|
||
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* The PSA CRYPTO PAKE and MbedTLS JPAKE API have a different
|
||
|
* handling of input sequencing.
|
||
|
*
|
||
|
* The MbedTLS JPAKE API takes the whole X1+X2 or X4S steps data
|
||
|
* at once as input, on the other side the PSA CRYPTO PAKE api requires
|
||
|
* the KEY_SHARE/ZP_PUBLIC/ZK_PROOF parts of X1, X2 & X4S to be
|
||
|
* given in sequence.
|
||
|
*
|
||
|
* In order to achieve API compatibility, each X1+X2 or X4S step data
|
||
|
* is stored sequentially in an intermediate buffer and given to the
|
||
|
* MbedTLS JPAKE API on the last step.
|
||
|
*
|
||
|
* This causes any input error to be only detected on the last step.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) {
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* Copy input to local buffer and format it as the Mbed TLS API
|
||
|
* expects, i.e. as defined by draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01 section 7.
|
||
|
* The summary is that the data for each step is prepended with a
|
||
|
* length byte, and then they're concatenated. Additionally, the
|
||
|
* server's second round output is prepended with a 3-bytes
|
||
|
* ECParameters structure - which means we have to prepend that when
|
||
|
* we're a client.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_KEY_SHARE &&
|
||
|
operation->role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT) {
|
||
|
/* We only support secp256r1. */
|
||
|
/* This is the ECParameters structure defined by RFC 8422. */
|
||
|
unsigned char ecparameters[3] = {
|
||
|
3, /* named_curve */
|
||
|
0, 23 /* secp256r1 */
|
||
|
};
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (operation->buffer_length + sizeof(ecparameters) >
|
||
|
sizeof(operation->buffer)) {
|
||
|
return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(operation->buffer + operation->buffer_length,
|
||
|
ecparameters, sizeof(ecparameters));
|
||
|
operation->buffer_length += sizeof(ecparameters);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* The core checks that input_length is smaller than
|
||
|
* PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE.
|
||
|
* Thus no risk of integer overflow here.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (operation->buffer_length + input_length + 1 > sizeof(operation->buffer)) {
|
||
|
return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Write the length byte */
|
||
|
operation->buffer[operation->buffer_length] = (uint8_t) input_length;
|
||
|
operation->buffer_length += 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Finally copy the data */
|
||
|
memcpy(operation->buffer + operation->buffer_length,
|
||
|
input, input_length);
|
||
|
operation->buffer_length += input_length;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Load buffer at each last round ZK_PROOF */
|
||
|
if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF) {
|
||
|
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&operation->ctx.jpake,
|
||
|
operation->buffer,
|
||
|
operation->buffer_length);
|
||
|
|
||
|
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->buffer, sizeof(operation->buffer));
|
||
|
operation->buffer_length = 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
|
return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
} else if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PROOF) {
|
||
|
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&operation->ctx.jpake,
|
||
|
operation->buffer,
|
||
|
operation->buffer_length);
|
||
|
|
||
|
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->buffer, sizeof(operation->buffer));
|
||
|
operation->buffer_length = 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
|
return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return PSA_SUCCESS;
|
||
|
} else
|
||
|
#else
|
||
|
(void) step;
|
||
|
(void) input;
|
||
|
(void) input_length;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
{ return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; }
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_input(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
|
||
|
psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step,
|
||
|
const uint8_t *input,
|
||
|
size_t input_length)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_pake_input_internal(
|
||
|
operation, step, input, input_length);
|
||
|
|
||
|
return status;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_get_implicit_key(
|
||
|
mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
|
||
|
uint8_t *output, size_t output_size,
|
||
|
size_t *output_length)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
|
|
||
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
|
||
|
if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) {
|
||
|
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(&operation->ctx.jpake,
|
||
|
output,
|
||
|
output_size,
|
||
|
output_length,
|
||
|
mbedtls_psa_get_random,
|
||
|
MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE);
|
||
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
|
return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return PSA_SUCCESS;
|
||
|
} else
|
||
|
#else
|
||
|
(void) output;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
{ return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; }
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_abort(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->password, operation->password_len);
|
||
|
operation->password = NULL;
|
||
|
operation->password_len = 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
|
||
|
if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) {
|
||
|
operation->role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_NONE;
|
||
|
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->buffer, sizeof(operation->buffer));
|
||
|
operation->buffer_length = 0;
|
||
|
operation->buffer_offset = 0;
|
||
|
mbedtls_ecjpake_free(&operation->ctx.jpake);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
operation->alg = PSA_ALG_NONE;
|
||
|
|
||
|
return PSA_SUCCESS;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */
|
||
|
|
||
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
|